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THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND STATE
JURISDICTION OVER-LABOR RELATIONS: I
BERNARD D. MELTZER*

The difficulties surrounding state jurisdiction over labor relations moved
a thoughtful commentator, writing in 1954, to describe the situation as a
"constitutional crisis." 1 There will naturally be disagreement as to whether
"crisis" was too strong a word. I believe, however, that there will be general
agreement that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have reflected
growing disorder and difficulties. The Court's opinions in International Union, UAW v. Russell2 and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,3

which provoked sharp dissents, have recently further blurred the borderland
of state competence. Accordingly, a re-examination of the Court's work in this
area may be justified despite the pages of scholarship which have already been
devoted to the issues involved.4
I.

BACKGROUND

An appreciation of the difficulties involved will be promoted by a reference to the familiar constitutional and statutory framework within which the
Court has dealt with federal and state power over labor relations.5 Congressional power over labor relations has in general depended on the scope given
to the commerce power. Under the restrictive constitutional doctrine prevailing prior to the constitutional revolution of the thirties, labor relations were
in general beyond the commerce power. Prior to the enactment of the Wagner
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. This article is a
revision of a paper which was submitted to the August 1958 meeting of the Council of
State Chief Justices. The revisions incorporate selected developments occurring after
that meeting. An earlier and substantially similar version of this article appeared in
8 U. Chi. L.S. Record, Autumn 1958, Specia.l Supp., p. 95.
1. Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. RrV.
959, 961 (1954).
2. 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting; Black, J., not
participating).
3. 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (with the Court divided as in Russell).
4. A far from exhaustive list of useful and comprehensive articles includes Bernstein, Complement or Conflict: Federal State Jurisdiction in Labor-Management Relations, 3 How. L.J. 191 (1957); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67
HARV. L. Rav. 1297 (1954); Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAIV.
L. Ray. 211 (1950) ; Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union
and employer Conduct, 49 MicH. L. REv. 191 (1950); Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v.
State Regulation, 1 J. PuB. L. 97 (1952); Isaacson, Federal Preemption Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAE. R.PL. REV. 391 (1958); Petro, Participationby the
States in the Enforcement and Development of National Labor Policy, 5 N.Y.U. ANN.
LAB. CoNp. 1 (1952) ; Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 5 N.Y.U. ANN. LAB. CoNF. 77 (1952) ; Reilly, State Rights and the Law of Labor
Relations, in LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 93 (1958) ; Rose, The Labor Manageinent Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. REv. 765 (1953).
5. It should be noted that while state power over labor relations "affecting commerce" was being pre-empted, state power to formulate labor policy (absent commerce

and pre-emption) was being expanded by the Court's reformulation and limitation of the
doctrine that picketing is "free speech" protected against state regulation by the fourteenth amendment. These developments are summarized in International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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Act0 in 1935, substantially all governmental regulation of labor-management
relations (except as to instrumentalitie of commerce, such as railroads and
shipping lines) was state regulation. In 1937, the Supreme Court, coming to
terms with a new regime of federal regulation, upheld the national authority
to regulate labor relations in manufacturing enterprises and sustained the
7
constitutionality of the Wagner Act.
In the Wagner Act, federal power over commerce was fully exercised,
in part, at least, because it had previously been given such narrow scope by
the Court. After that act was sustained, each decision broadening constitutional authority under the commerce clause enlarged the statutory power of
the NLRB. The reach of the Board's statutory jurisdiction was thus determined by the accidents of constitutional litigation rather than by a considered
judgment concerning either the desirability of extending federal labor regulation to enterprises of predominantly local character or the capacity of the
national board to exercise effectively the far-reaching responsibilities conferred on it by essentially constitutional adjudication. Insofar as the recognition of federal competence operated to oust state power over matters "affecting commerce," constitutional considerations, although often fortuitous as to
the proper adjustment between existing state and federal regulation, were
decisive.

In the early administration of the Wagner Act, the newly confirmed
federal power was for a time pressed close to its periphery. As a result, the
NLRB was in danger of being swamped by a mass of cases which it considered relatively minor and which would have conscripted the time and energies necessary for the effective handling of cases which appeared to the
Board to have a more significant impact on the national interest. In order to
husband its resources, which appeared inadequate for the full exercise of its

statutory authority, the Board, as a matter of administrative policy, declined
on a case-by-case basis to exercise jurisdiction over small business and particular types of business, such as hotels and restaurants, which it considered

essentially local in character.8
Although the reach of the Wagner Act was long, encompassing all enterprises whose impact on interstate commerce could be said to be more than
de minimis,9 its purpose and its prohibitions were relatively narrow. It was

designed to protect the employees' freedom to choose representatives for col6. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§141-67 (1952).
7. See generally Cox, supra note 4, at 1298-1300; Hays, supra note 1, at 961-62;

Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv.
645, 674-82 (1946).
8. After the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board replaced its ad hoc
approach with published jurisdictional standards. See generally Note, The Discretionary
Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 71 HARv. L. REv. 527 (1958).
9. See Polish Natl Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944); NLRB v. Fain-

blatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
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lective bargaining and to engage in the group activity which usually precedes
and accompanies such bargaining. The act implemented those purposes by
proscribing employer coercion and interference with such activities and by
providing for representation machinery which would register the employees'
wishes.
The Wagner Act did not regulate union pressures in any way, and it
was generally assumed that state competence over such matters remained.1 0
Nevertheless, the overtones of certain Supreme Court decisions" suggested
that the Court might curtail state competence by expansively reading the
national proscription of employer interference with "concerted activities" as
precluding similar interference through state regulation.
There was no occasion to resolve this problem because the enactment
of the Taft-Hartley Act 12 significantly changed the framework in which state
power was to be defined. The purposes behind the act were much broader
than those of the original NLRA. At the risk of oversimplification, three of
its principal purposes may usefully be mentioned: (1) protection of employee
self-determination against union, as well as employer, pressures ;"' (2) protection of employers and the public against the disruption caused by certain
"bad practices" of unions;14 and (3) a general increase in the power of employers relative to that of unions, whose strength had grown and had been
vigorously exerted during the war and postwar period.1 To achieve these
purposes, the act regulated strikes, picketing, and boycotts. In addition, it
sought to protect the integrity of collective bargaining agreements by proscribing pressures to modify them during their agreed-upon term"6 and by
7
providing for their enforcement in the federal courts .
Taft-Hartley thus laid hold of aspects of labor relations which, except
for the incidental impact of the Sherman Act, had been left wholly to state
regulation. Such regulation was, however, not a discrete and nicely identifiable body of law. It consisted not only of labor relations statutes, tailor-made
for labor-management problems, but also of an extensive body of statutory and
common law regulation of general application which impinged on such
problems.
Even if Congress had been aware of the problems of federalism posed
46

10. See Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations,
MicH.

L. Rav. 593, 606 (1948).

11. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Allen-Bradley Local 1111,
United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 750-51
(1942).

12. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 141-88 (1952), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 154, 172, 178, 188 (Supp. V, 1958) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
13. See LMRA § 1(a).

14. See LMRA § 8(b).
15. See M.LLIs & BROWN,

FROM THE WAGNER

16. LMRA §§ 8(b) (3), 8(d).

AcT

TO TArT-HARTLEY

17. LMRA § 301.
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by the act, congressional formulation of guides for allocating power would
have involved formidable intellectual and political difficulties. It is reasonably clear, however, that Congress, including the principal draftsmen of the
act, did not appreciate the problems involved, 18 let alone the fact that the
ultimate allocation between state and national authority could frustrate the
purposes articulated by particular legislators and shared perhaps by a majority
of them. In any event, congressional directions were, as the Court has frequently observed, fragmentary and elusive. 19 As a result, there was committed to the Court the task of adjusting two intricate systems of regulation.
The Court, in turn, purported to determine what Congress "intended," or
what it would have "intended" if it had appreciated the problems involved,
or what kind of adjustments between federal and state power made sense
within the fxamework of the national regulation.
Such a task is always difficult, in part because of the controversy surrounding the proper role of the states under modern economic and technological
conditions and also because of the difficulty of separating the issue of who
should regulate from issues concerning the merits of particular regulation.
In the context of labor relations, two considerations have made the latter
difficulty peculiarly acute: (1) the "community," as well as unions and
employers, has remained sharply divided as to the content of a wise labor
policy; and (2) unions have generally urged the contraction of state power,
while employers have generally urged its preservation. The Court, even
assuming that it could stay above the partisan battle, could scarcely expect
powerful, vocal, and disappointed interest groups to concede its detachment.
Thus, the coalescence of touchy problems of federalism with controversial
issues of labor policy invited and produced public misunderstanding and disparagement of the Court's work.
The Court's treatment of the problems involved can conveniently be
discussed in terms of three familiar categories of conduct developed by the
NLRB and the federal courts for the purpose of administering the Wagner
Act and subsequently the LMRA: (1) federally protected activity; (2) federally prohibited activity; and (3) an intermediate category of activity, neither
protected nor prohibited by federal law.20
18. See, e g. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
AcT, 1947, at 139-80 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGis. HIST.]; Hays, supra note 1, at
965-66. But cf. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 44 (1947), 1 LEaIs. HisT.
331, 335. For a general discussion of the legislative history as it bears on pre-emption
problems, see Smith, supra note 10, passim. But cf. Cox & Seidman, supra note 4, passin.
19. Congress dealt explicitly with federalist problems in § 14(a), dealing with
supervisors; in § 14(b), dealing with state regulation of union security arrangements;
in § 8(d) (3), prescribing notice of a bargaining impasse to state mediation services;
and in § 10(a), prescribing the conditions for cession by the NLRB of its powers to
the states.
20. Before turning to these categories, it is convenient to note that the Court has

made it clear that state agencies are ousted of jurisdiction over representation cases
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FEDERALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY

The failure of the Wagner Act to regulate employee activities, its silence
about state power,2 1 and the bitter controversy which surrounded its imposition of restraints on employer power might have been regarded as indicating
that state power was not to be curtailed. State regulation, designed ostensibly
at least to promote the public interest, was manifestly different from the
exercise of private economic power, designed to promote private interests.
Nevertheless, Hill v. Floridaex rel. Watson22 suggested that the Wagner Act
would be expansively read as excluding state, as well as employer, interference with protected activities. In that case, the Court invalidated a Fl.orida
criminal statute imposing licensing requirements on union agents and reporting requirements on unions. 23 The Court, equating state interference with
employer interference, concluded that Florida's restriction on the freedom of
employees to choose a bargaining representative was incompatible with the
declared national purpose of promoting such freedom. 24 This decision was
an understandable reaction to the harsh features of the Florida law, which
could have been viewed as an effort to frustrate the central purpose of the
national scheme. But, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter forcefully urged in dissent,
there was nothing in the Wagner Act which was directed at restraining state
power. Accordingly, the state regulation could have operated without
"conflict" with the federal scheme. The Court's rejection of this approach and
its broad rationale implied that a large body of state regulation would be
25
invalidated, but this implication was scarcely noticed at the time.

"affectifng commerce," without regard to whether the state criteria conflict or coincide
with the pertinent federal standards. La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations
Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947). See also Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957). For a discussion of the representation cases see Cox & Seidman, supra note 4,
at 212-18; note 44 infra.
21. The committee reports also are silent on this issue. See Smith, mepra note 10,
at 606.
22. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
23. The Court recently invoked the fourteenth amendment rather than pre-emption
to invalidate a similar but harsher local regulation. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313 (1958).
24. As Mr. Chief Justice Stone argued in his partial dissent, this consideration did
not justify the invalidation of the Florida requirement for annual reports by labor
organizations, giving the names and addresses of officers and the location of offices.
The Court, although conceding that this requirement was compatible with the national
scheme, invalidated it on the curious ground that the imposition of punishment for noncompliance would create an obstacle to collective bargaining. 325 U.S. at 543. A
reductio ad absurdnin of this argument would be a holding that state criminal laws
against theft of union property, although not in conflict with the federal act, could not
be enforced against union officials because imprisonment of union officials would interfere with the employees' free choice of their bargaining representative.
25. The dim future for state regulation was recognized, however, in Note, State
Regulation of Labor Unions, 55 YALE L.J. 440, 445 (1946).
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After the passage of Taft-Hartley, the opponents of state power could
urge, first, that Hill v. Florida,which had not been disturbed by Congress,precluded state regulation of "protected activities" and, secondly, that congressional regulation of certain forms of union conduct excluded supplementary
7
as well as parallel state regulation.h
28
In InternationalUnion, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
the so-called Briggs-Stratton case, the Court considered only the question
raised by the first of these contentions as the substantial one. 29 Perhaps this
emphasis arose from the fact that the case had come before the state board
when only the Wagner Act, which did not regulate union practices, was in
effect. The Wisconsin order was, however, to continue in effect after the
enactment of the LMRA; accordingly, the Court considered the order in relation to both statutes.
The Wisconsin order challenged in Briggs-Stratton had restrained unannounced and intermittent work stoppages called by a union, without any
disclosure of the union's demands, during negotiations for a new contract.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court, in a five to four decision,
rejected the broad argument that Congress had completely ousted state power
over labor relations. It accepted, however, the narrower contention that the
states were precluded from prohibiting conduct protected by federal law, and
it declared generally that the states could reach only employee conduct which
was neither federally protected nor prohibited. The Court indicated, moreover, that the states could declare conduct illegal because of the methods involved,3 0 but that they could not outlaw the purposes of union or employee
3s1
conduct solely on the ground that they were pursued by concerted action.
26. In a supplemental Senate report on the bill which after amendment became the

LMRA, the late Senator Taft referred to Hill v. Florida as posing important questions of

accommodating federal and state legislation. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1947), 1 LEGIs. HIST. 412. This reference occurred in connection with a discussion
of whether the federal act would permit a union shop in states illegalizing such arrangements. Subsequently, the union security problem was dealt with by a specific recognition
of state power in § 14(b) of the LMRA.
27. See Ratner, supra note 4, at 82, 94-95. But cf. Petro, stpra note 4.
28. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
29. Id. at 252. It should be noted that in Briggs-Stratton and in all of the cases prior
to Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), the Court, in invalidating state
regulation, carefully noted that the enterprise involved was one over which the NLRB
would customarily exercise jurisdiction. The Guss case obliterated any distinction based
on the Board's declination of its statutory jurisdiction. See notes 170-87 infra and
accompanying text.
30. This statement was supported by the assertion that the federal act proscribed
strikes only because their objectives, as distinguished from their means, were illegal.
336 U.S. at 253. That assertion was plainly in error. See United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ; LMRA § 8(b) (1) (A).
31. 336 U.S. at 257-58. But see Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480
(1955). See also Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319,
336-37 (1951), suggesting that this limitation was designed to avoid encroachment on
concerted activities through the illegal purpose test. It should be noted that insofar as
state proscription of purposes rests on their incompatibility with the LMRA, the basic
evils inherent in judicial policy-making via "illegal purpose' are obviated.
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Concluding that the "quickie strike" was a "coercive" method which was neither federally protected nor prohibited,3 2 the Court sustained the Wisconsin
order.
The general approach reflected in Briggs-Stratton became the basis for
3
a unanimous decision in International Union, UA W v. O'Brien,"
which invalidated a Michigan statute prescribing a favorable employee strike vote and
a waiting period as prerequisites for strike action. The decisive consideration
was that
in the National Labor Relations Act . . . Congress safeguarded
the exercise by employees of "concerted activities" and expressly
recognized the right to strike. It qualified and regulated that right
in the 1947 Act ....
None of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages.
Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation ....
Even if some state legislation in this area could be sustained,
the particular statute before us could not stand. For it conflicts with
the federal Act 3 4
In Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bid,3 5 the Court made it clear that not even the most pressing state
interest would open the door to state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher
wages. It invalidated a Wisconsin statute prohibiting strikes and lockouts
and requiring compulsory arbitration in connection with certain disputes involving public utilities. The Court's opinion not only relied on the conflict
between the Wisconsin regulation and the federal protection of the right to
strike for higher wages, but also urged that Congress, by imposing certain
restrictions on strikes, had "closed to state regulation the field of peaceful
strikes in industries affecting commerce. '3 6 It was not clear, however, whether
the Court was suggesting the complete ouster of state power over peaceful
3
strikes even in the absence of an encroachment on protected activities. 7
The dissenters urged weighty objections against the Court's holding.
The states had traditionally subjected utilities to broad and special regulation
not applicable to other industries. There was nothing in the federal act which
implied the ouster of state power to deal with emergencies "economically and
32. In view of the suggestion in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955),
discussed in text accompanying notes 54-56 infra, that the possibility that conduct is
federally prohibited excludes state action, it should be noted that similar harassing tactics
during negotiations were subsequently held by the NLRB to be in violation of LMRA
§ 8(b) (3). Textile Workers, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforcement denied. 217 F.2d
409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 1004, cert. vacated, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
33. 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
34. Id. at 456-58. (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.) It is not entirely clear
from this passage whether the Court was relying on "conflict" or "occupation of the field."
In the last paragraph of the opinion, the Court highlighted the conflict theme by referring
to the Briggs-Stratton principle as "controlling." Id. at 459.
35. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
36. Id. at 394.
37. See id. at 388-89.
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practically confined within a State. '38 On the contrary, the federal provisions
for national emergency strikes implied state power to deal with comparable
local situations beyond the reach of those provisions 39
It should be noted that the Court's sanction of state power over "violence" on the picket line was in sharp contrast to its denial of state power to
maintain the flow of essential services. 40 Plainly, a breakdown in such services could enormously increase and complicate the problem of preserving order. Furthermore, such a breakdown posed at least as serious a problem for
local authorities as a breach in the etiquette of picketing.
The considerations supporting state competence over public utility disputes, regardless of their persuasiveness, were irrelevant under the formula
approved in O'Brien. Adherence to that formula would achieve a measure of
predictability, but the formula plainly had the defects of its virtue. It necessarily excluded any attempt to balance the interests at stake, such as the nature and importance of the state interest involved, the impact of the challenged
state regulation on the principal objectives of the national scheme, and the
significance of the regulatory gap left by the ouster of state regulation and
by the inapplicability of comparable national regulation to a local problem
which local authorities reasonably considered to be acute. The exclusion of
such considerations gave decisive effect to an abstract formula even though
such a formula could not be supported in terms of either a plainly expressed
42
legislative purpose4 ' or the consequences produced in concrete situations.

III.

FEDERALLY PROHIBITED ACTIVITY

Where state preventive remedies reached activities which were (or might
be) prohibited by federal law, the Court ousted state power on the basis of
three interrelated considerations: (1) state enforcement of parallel prohibitions would interfere with centralized and expert administration of the na38. Id. at 407 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. The Amalgamated decision seems to have been misunderstood in State v. Local
8-6, Oil Workers, 317 S.W2d 309 (Mo. 1958). The Missouri Supreme Court upheld an
injunction barring a continuation of a strike against a gas utility seized by the Governor,
pursuant to the Ying-Thompson Act, in order to protect public health and welfare. The
court distinguished Amalgamated on the ground that the Missouri statute did not provide
for compulsory arbitration. This distinction plainly ignored the encroachment on protected activities resulting from the injunction against a peaceful economic strike. A more
persuasive distinction would have resulted from treating the state as the employer, thereby
excluding the employees from the protection of the LMRA. See LMRA §§2(2), 2(3);
cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). The overhanging threat of and the
actual use of seizure after a bargaining impasse may be invalidated as contrary to the
federal protection of collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the expedient of temporary
government seizure coupled with exclusion of the employees involved from LMRA protection offers an escape from the grave difficulties produced by the Amalgamated decision.
40. Cf. 340 U.S. at 404 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also notes 81-112 infra and
accompanying text.
41. See Hays, supra note 1, at 964-66 (urging that the Court misinterpreted the
congressional intent on which it so heavily relied).
42. For a less controversial application of Briggs-Stratton, see UMW v. Arkansas
Oak Flooring Co., 351 5.S. 62 (1956), which invalidated, as a restraint on protected
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tional act by the NLRB and would create the "conflict" inherent in overlapping remedies and successive state and federal adjudication of the same conduct; (2) the line between protected and prohibited conduct is so indistinct
that state regulation of conduct which might be proscribed by the LMRA involves the risk of curtailing activity which might be protected under the federal act; and (3) the federal act by regulating only certain forms of conduct
implies that related forms of conduct are to be free from other sources of restraint. It should be noted that state power was denied only with respect to
injunctive relief against peaceful conduct and that different questions are
raised both by state injunctions against violence or intimidation and by state
damage actions whether for violent or peaceful activity.
The exclusion of parallel state relief began with Plankinton Packing
Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. 43 The Court, in a cryptic per
curiam opinion,44 invalidated a Wisconsin order requiring an employer to
reinstate an employee with back pay because of a discriminatory discharge
which had violated both the Wisconsin act and the LMRA. In a later case,
the Court chose to explain Plankinton on extremely broad grounds, stating:
Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only guarantees
the right of self-organization and the right to strike, but also guarantees to individual employees the "right to refrain from any or all of
such activities", at least in the absence of a union shop or similar
contractual arrangement applicable to the individual. Since the
N. L. R. B. was given jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the
employees, it was clear that the Federal Act had occupied this field
to the exclusion of state regulation. Plankinton and O'Brien both
show that states may not regulate in respect to rights guaranteed
by Congress in §7.45

activities, a state injunction against recognition picketing by a union with majority
support, notwithstanding the union's noncompliance with the filing requirements of the
LMRA. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented.
43. 338 U.S. 953 (1950).
44. The opinion cited La Crosse Tel..Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 13d.,
336 U.S. 18 (1949), and Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947). In these two cases, the Court had recognized the NLRB's
exclusive jurisdiction over representation questions in any business subject to the Board's
effective jurisdiction. Since a state decision, even though based on criteria consistent with
the federal criteria, might establish a representation pattern incompatible with federal
policy, and since such patterns have continuing consequences under the federal act, the
Court in La Crosse found "the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit
intrusion of the state agency, even though the National Board had not acted in the
particular [case] ....

."

336 U.S. at 25. The Court's summary reliance on these cases

ignored the problems raised both by the explicit recognition in LMRA § 14(b) of state
competence over union security arrangements and by the legislative history of that subsection, which suggested that state jurisdiction over such arrangements was not to be
impaired. See notes 125-47 infra and accompanying text.
45. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 390 n.12 (1951). Mr. Justice Frankfurter interpreted
Plankinton as involving an overlap of federal and state unfair labor practices. Id. at 402
(dissenting opinion).
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Thus, O'Brien, which had denied state power to curtail section 7 rights, was
invoked to bar state power to enforce those rights.
In Garner v. Teamsters Union,46 one theme, and perhaps the dominant
one, in the Court's opinion implied the complete ouster of state authority
over peaceful union conduct without regard to its classification. But the
Court in a confusing departure from its own premises also indicated that in
some circumstances the states retained authority over conduct neither protected nor prohibited by the national statute. Garner, because it is the leading
pre-emption case and because of its obscurities, merits extended discussion.
In Garner, the Teamsters had picketed a trucking company, apparently
for recognition. Although the company had not objected to unionization, the
Teamsters had recruited only four of its twenty-four employees before the
picketing began. The picketing, which had resulted in a drastic decline in
the company's business, had been enjoined as a violation of the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had reversed on
the ground that the alleged union conduct also constituted a federal unfair
47
labor practice and that the federal remedy was adequate and exclusive.
One dissenter had rejected this position for practical reasons, namely, that
the federal remedy was inadequate because the slow processes of the national
board could not prevent imminent and irreparable harm to the employer.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of state jurisdiction in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Jackson.
The Court cited Briggs-Stratton (also written by Mr. Justice Jackson)
with approval but distinguished it on the ground that Garner did not involve
"injurious conduct" which either is "governable by the State or . . . is
entirely ungoverned." 48 The Court emphasized that the national statute in
language almost identical to that of the Pennsylvania provision had proscribed
the union coercion involved. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly refrained
from finding a violation of the federal act because "the duty of primary
49
decision lies with the Board."
The emphasis on the probable illegality of the union's conduct together
with the continued vitality given to Briggs-Stratton suggests that Garner
could be narrowly interpreted as merely invalidating state regulation which
parallels the federal act. Indeed, it was so interpreted in Weber v. AnheuserBusch, Inc.50 and in United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.r1
It may be noted in passing, however, that the Court's conclusion that a
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

346 U.S. 485 (1953).
373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
346 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 489.
See 348 U.S. 468, 475, 479 (1955).
347 U.S. 656, 663, 665 (1954).
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federal violation was involved was not justified by the record tested by the
Board's precedents.5 2
IV.

ACTIVITY NEITHER PROTECTED NOR PROHIBITED

Under the narrow interpretation of Garner,union action, if it were classified as neither protected by section 7 nor prohibited by section 8, would
be subject to state power in accordance with the Briggs-Stratton dictum.
State boards and courts would determine the facts, and if they classified the
conduct involved as "ungoverned" by federal law, they would apply state
law. The propriety of this classification, on which state.jurisdiction would
turn, would be subject to ultimate review by the Supreme Court.
Such an interpretation is, however, inconsistent with the importance
attached by the Court to "primary interpretation" by the NLRB. In the
absence of such interpertation, the Court was unwilling to rule directly on
the legality of the union's conduct under the national act. Such unwillingness
would in general disable the Court from disposing of federal questions raised
by a claim of state encroachment on federally protected or prohibited conduct. Except for the unlikely situation where the Board bad previously
characterized the conduct involved as neither protected nor prohibited, such
state encroachments could be avoided only by foreclosing state power over
conduct "ungoverned" by federal law as well as over federally prohibited
or protected conduct.
The comprehensive ouster of state power necessary to protect "primary
interpretation" was also implied by language in Garner suggesting that for
the purpose of determining state power there were only two relevant categories of conduct, namely prohibited and protected:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of speci-

fied types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to
be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of
the national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all
picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall
within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the
public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of
picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat de52. The Supreme Court's intimation in Garner that the union's conduct violated

§8(b) (2), 346 U.S. at 488-89, apparently resulted from the parties' stipulation to that

effect. See Brief for Respondent, p. 15; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 15, 84. That stipulation
was, however, not justified by the record read in the light of the NLRB precedents, under
which a finding of a § 8(b) (2) violation would have been justified only if the picketing
had been directed at achieving a closed or union shop. But there had not been any
allegation of that purpose, and the Chancellor had found that the union had been engaged
in organizational picketing and that it had not requested recognition, let alone a union
shop. Record, vol. 50, pp. 4a-7a, 173a, 174a, 176a, 187a. Minority picketing, whether for
recognition or organizational purposes, had not been held to be an unfair labor practice
under the federal act. See Comment, Federal Versus State Jurisdiction Over Stranger
Picketing, 20 U. CHLi. L. REv. 109, 112-13 (1952).
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signed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as
if the state were to declare picketing
free for purposes or by methods
53
which the federal Act prohibits.
The foregoing implication of the total ouster of state power is plainly incompatible with the result and the approach in Briggs-Stratton,where, it will be
recalled, the Court appraised the union conduct prior to a Board determination and granted the same latitude to a state agency. Accordingly, despite the
Court's continued approval of that case, it appears to be a doubtful basis for
state competence over unprohibited and unprotected conduct.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch deepened the uncertainties produced by Garner. Weber arose from an old work assignment dispute between machinists
and millwrights. During negotiations for a 1952 contract, the machinists had
requested that the company agree to give certain repair work on its machinery
only to contractors under contract with their union. A similar clause had
been in and out of earlier agreements, with its status presumably dependent
on the company's response to the pressures of the rival unions. In the 1952
negotiations, the millwrights' protests led the company to reject the machinists' demand. The machinists thereupon struck and picketed the company's premises. A detailed statement of the subsequent litigation will highlight the uncertainties and the practical obstacles involved in applying the
primary jurisdiction approach described in Garner and Weber,
The company promptly charged before the NLRB that the machinists
had violated subsection 8(b) (4) (D) of the LMRA. Seven months later, the
NLRB quashed a notice of hearing on the ground that there had been no
violation of that subsection. Somewhat less than two weeks after its resort to
the NLRB, the company sought a state court injunction, alleging that the machinists had violated the common law prohibitions against secondary boycotts
as well as three provisions of section 8 of the LMRA, 8(b) (4) (A), (B),
and (D). After the issuance of a temporary injunction, the company
amended its complaint to allege also that the machinists had been guilty of a
restraint of trade in violation of the Missouri common law and statutes. More
than a year after the NLRB had determined that 8(b) (4) (D) had not been
violated, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the permanent injunction. The
United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
The Court referred to the possibility that the machinists, as alleged by
the company in the state courts, had violated subsections 8(b) (4) (A) and
(B) of the LMRA. Those possibilities, the Court emphasized, had not been
ruled on by the NLRB, which had negatived only the alleged violation of a
different subsection. If the Board had also ruled, against a claimed violation
53. 346 U.S. at 499-500. (Emphasis added.)
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of the other subsections, "we would have a different case." 5 4 But Garner had
indicated that the hypothetical case would not be different, by suggesting that

conduct free from federal regulation could not properly be subject to state
restrictions. Plainly the hypothetical case would be different only if the
Court repudiated that suggestion. In Weber, such repudiation was implied
by language suggesting that pre-emption would operate only when the conduct involved is, or may reasonably be deemed to be, either federally prohibited or federally protected. 55 Weber may thus be read as recognizing state
power over cases involving conduct which is clearly not protected and

clearly not prohibited, i.e., Weber would permit some departures from "primary interpretation" by the NLRB. Weber would curtail somewhat the state
competence sanctioned by Briggs-Stratton5,6
but would extend it beyond the
narrow limits suggested by Garner. This interpretation gains additional support from the Court's sympathetic reference to the difficulties surrounding
state court determination as to the protected or prohibited character of concerted activities.5 7 Such difficulties would exist only if the states retain some
jurisdiction over conduct which falls within the intermediate category.
The uncertainties and difficulties generated for state courts and for
counsel by these cases scarcely need elaboration. Notwithstanding Garner,
state competence may survive if the Board's General Counsel issues
a complaint and if the Board's rulings negative every possibility (or every
reasonable or plausible possibility) that the conduct complained of is
prohibited by federal law. But even such rulings will not destroy the
possibility that the conduct involved is protected. Perfect avoidance of that
54. 348 U.S. at 478.

55. [E]ven if it were clear that no unfair labor practices were involved, it would
not necessarily follow that the State was free to issue its injunction. If this
conduct does not fall within the prohibitions of § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
it may fall within the protection of § 7, as concerted activity for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection.
Id. at 478-79. See also id. at 479, 481. "Concerted activity," as used above, apparently
refers to activity protected against employer reprisal and not, as Garner suggested, to
activity not subject to federal prohibition. This interpretation is reinforced by the Court's
statement, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 313 (1949): "Where the State and federal laws
do not overlap, no cession is necessary because the State's jurisdiction is unimpaired."
The Weber opinion also emphasized that the plaintiff had alleged in the state proceedings that the conduct complained of was a federal unfair labor practice. 348 U.S. at
479, 481. Such an allegation was, moreover, considered controlling in Local 25, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155, 161 (1956).
Under the broad implications of Garner, such allegations would be of no importance since
the states would be excluded regardless of state overlap with federal remedies or state
encroachment on activities protected by § 7 of the LMRA. Perhaps the limitation of
Garner implicit in some portions of Weber moved Mr. Justice Black, an exponent of
broad pre-emption in the area of labor relations, to concur in the result only.
56. Weber did not, however, refer to the intimation in Briggs-Stratton that the states
were limited to regulating the means, rather than purposes, of union conduct. See text
accompanying note 30 supra. Since the union indulged in a peaceful strike, that limitation,
if controlling, would have disposed of the case.
57. For similar expressions, also by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, see Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955).
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possibility would require an adjudication by the national board that the
conduct complained of is not protected. But the Board's dismissal of a
charge, although it generally discloses that the conduct is not prohibited, at
least by the statutory provision specifically invoked, does not necessarily
disclose whether the conduct is protected. There is, moreover, no possibility
of securing a Board adjudication as to whether many significant and questionable forms of union pressure are "protected." The category of protected
conduct has been elaborated under the NLRA and the LMRA for the purpose
of insulating certain forms of concerted employee action against employer
interference and reprisal. The NLRB, accordingly, is not faced with the
need of adjudicating whether particular conduct is protected absent an
employment relationship ind a complaint about employer interference with
such a relationship: Thhis, where, as in Garner, an employer complains about
stranger picketing, the concept of activities protected by section 7 is not directly
applicable. s It would be applicable if a few employees had participated in
minority picketing and had been discharged. But even if the General Counsel
issued a complaint, a Board ruling as to the protected status of the employee
picketing would usually involve such delay as to make any theoretical state
preventive jurisdiction valueless for most practical purposes.
The foregoing considerations show that the labor-management area is
not appropriate for the application of a concept of "primary jurisdiction,"
i.e., a requirement of prior NLRB determinations in particular cases which
in turn would fix the limits for state action. It is the suggestion of such a
concept by some passages of Garer and Weber which accounts for much
of the extraordinary confusion produced by these cases-confusion which is
accentuated by the Court's continued approval of Briggs-Stratton despite its
obvious incompatibility with "primary interpretation and application" by
the NLRB. Such interpretation plainly cannot be preserved, if state tribunals
are to be authorized to interpret the national standards in the first instance.
And the obstacles 'to securing NLRB adjudications prior to state action
suggest that the NLRB's interpretation, if it is to be primary, must in most
cases also be exclusive. Guss,59 Fairlawn,60 and SaX61 point to such exclusiveness and its corollary, complete pre-emption of state power.
58. That concept is indirectly applicable because employees who participate in conduct
which constitutes an unfair labor practice by a union are normally divested of statutory
protection vis-i-vis their employer.
59. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10 (1957).
60. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24
(1957), where the Court declared that "Congress did not leave it to state labor agencies,
to state courts or to this Court to decide how consistent with federal policy state law
must be. The power to make that decision in the first instance was given to the National
Labor Relations Board . . . !"

61. Hotel Employees Union v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 358 U.S. 270, 271 (1959), a per
curiam opinion, in which the Court, after reversing Florida injunctions against peaceful
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Such pre-emption has been supported not only to avoid a wholly unsuitable "primary jurisdiction" concept but also on two related grounds. First,
the prohibitions of the federal act have struck a balance between contending
forces. Congress in determining what was to be prohibited was also concerned with conduct which was to be free. Accordingly, additional state
limitations on freedom of action through prohibitions on unions or employers
would destroy that balance and would therefore be inconsistert with the
federal policy.0 2 Secondly, the uniform regulation of labor relations which
can be achieved only by the ouster of state regulation would be desirable
as a matter of policy.
The balance metaphor, insofar as it purports to reflect the legislative
purpose assumes a critical question, i.e., whether it is reasonable to impute
to Congress the purpose of completely pre-empting state power. The most
detached advocates of complete pre-emption will concede that there is no
clear evidence of such a purpose. 3 On the contrary, it is extremely unlikely
that the architects of Taft-Hartley sanctioned such a far-reaching alteration
in the federalist balance or would have done so if they had been aware of
the possibility of such a result. Their basic philosophy, after all, essentially
favored "states' rights." Furthermore, when the issue of state power was
raised on the floor, the debate generally appeared to be based on the
assumption that state power survived. 64 Finally, the architects of the act
were astounded by some of the results wrought in the name of the legislative purpose. 65
In view of the inconclusiveness, to say the least, of the legislative history,
obliteration of state power would appear to be justified only by strong considerations of policy. Even if agreement could be reached on the existence
of such considerations, there would remain the familiar question as to whether
the Court should maintain state power until Congress plainly calls for its
obliteration.
"organizational" picketing, declared that state jurisdiction was ousted "whether it [the
picketing] was activity protected by § 7 . . . or prohibited by § 8(b) (4) of the Act ......
Since previous decisions foreclose state power over both prohibited and protected activities, the quoted statement is not very meaningful unless the Court "intended" that statement to be read as if the words "or not" preceded "whether," thus indicating the ouster of
state power over activities neither protected nor prohibited.
62. See, e.g., Cox, .rpra note 4, at 1318-19; Ratner, supra note 4, at 97-98.
63. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 1314-15. But see Isaacson, supra note 4, at 392-93.
64. See, e.g., 2 LEGis. HIsT. 1019-20, 1195, 1208, 1379-80; Hays, supra note 1, at
964-65. But cf., e.g., 2 Lais. HIsT. 1561 (Senator Morse challenged § 14(b) and urged
a national policy with respect to union security arrangements); H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1 LEGIS. HIST. 331. It is also worth noting that opponents
of the legislation objected on the ground that it increased the power of the federal government. Such criticism was couched in terms of encroachment on or duplication of traditional state power, not in terms of displacing it. See 1 LEGIS. HIST. 356; 2 id. 1258,
1261-62, 1266, 1385.
65. See Hays, supra note 1, at 965-66.
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The case on policy grounds for comprehensive pre-emption emphasizes
the following considerations :66
(1) State power may frustrate the development and implementation of
the national policy. Labor relations are part of a continuous human relationship; intervention at one point inevitably affects the whole process.
(2) State competence would destroy the uniformity and convenience
which are part of the justification for national legislation. It would invite
competition among the states in drafting "pro-management laws" to attract
industry.
(3) It is desirable to avoid the difficulties inherent in interpretation by
state tribunals of a complex and swiftly changing body of national regulation
as well as the fine lines of distinction inherent in preserving some areas of
state competence.
(4) The federalist values of local autonomy, diversity, and experimentation can be fostered by withdrawing the labor relations of smaller enterprises
from the NLRB's jurisdiction and leaving their regulation exclusively to the
states.
Appraisal of such considerations will obviously involve judgments or
predilections about the contemporary role of state power, as well as judgments
about the coherence and gaps in the particular federal legislation which is
urged as the basis for state supersession. There is plainly no formula which
will yield the proper appraisal. Several general comments may, however,
sharpen the issues involved. In a society with a federalist tradition, the "uniformity" which is part of the justification for federal regulation consists of
two extremely different kinds of uniformity. First, there is the uniformity
which results when the national power is exercised to enforce minimal standards of conduct within the sphere of the national interest. Secondly, there is the
uniformity which can be achieved only by an exclusive system of national regulation. Plainly, the first type of uniformity does not theoretically involve total
pre-emption of state power; for regardless of whether or how the states act,
they are precluded only from action which is inconsistent with the minimum
national standards. In practice, there will, of course, be acute controversy
as to whether particular state regulation "conflicts" with such standards. And
to the extent that the states are in error as to the existence of "conflict," there
will be an impairment of national purposes, an impairment which cannot be
fully corrected by Supreme Court reversals. But unless federal regulation
in any context is, contrary to our tradition,6 7 to destroy state competence,
in each case the values of preserving "consistent" state power, i.e., the values
66. See Cox, supra note 4, at 1315-21.
67. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

435 (1953).
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of federalism, must be balanced against the danger of deranging the federal
scheme. The fact that different aspects of labor relations are interrelated
does not materially help in striking that balance because similar interrelationships exist in connection with almost any activity subject to federal regulation.
Nor does the objective of excluding competition in the enactment of "proemployer legislation" justify total state pre-emption. This question cannot
usefully be decided as an abstraction without regard to gaps," in the federal
scheme which state action might fill in such a way as to implement the basic
federal purposes. Furthermore, the objective of avoiding competition through
variations in state law could be achieved only by displacing a vast body of
state law of general application which impinges on labor relations. Even the
most ardent pre-emptionists shrink from the regulatory gaps flowing from
such an attrition of state power. 69 Nevertheless, general regulations, such as
laws concerning safety, health, maximum hours for women, and hiring practices, probably have at least as strong an impact on interstate rivalry for new
businesses as does the regulation of activities neither prohibited nor protected
by the national law. The same point may be even more important in connection with differences in local taxes. Finally, competition through legal
differences which are compatible with nationally prescribed minima is merely
another way of describing the characteristic values, complexities, and costs
of a federal scheme.
No one who has wrestled with the Court's decisions in this area can be
unsympathetic to the objective of reducing "fine lines of distinction." At the
same time, no one bred in the common law tradition can ignore the need for
discriminating distinctions directed at achieving some rational development of
statutory and social purposes.70 Whether particular lines of distinction will
succeed in achieving such purposes or whether they are worth the cost are
debatable questions. But able commentators, such as Professor Cox, who have
espoused a broad pre-emption of state power, in part to avoid fine distinctions,

68. There is an obvious danger of resolving pre-emption questions by labelling the
LMRA as a "complete code" or as "interstitial." Although the latter label is, I believe,
justified by the gaps and incongruities in the statute which are discussed below, able
commentators, such as Professor Cox and Mr. Isaacson, prefer the former label.
69. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 4, at 104-10; cf. Local 24, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters,
AFL-CIO v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297 (1959), discussed in note 162 infra, which
suggests that local health and safety regulation will not be pre-empted.
70. "Statutory purposes" in this context obviously involves the risk of questionbegging. If the LMRA is viewed as a "complete code!' of regulation, any purpose which
it fails to achieve is, by definition, not a "statutory purpose." But such verbalism should
be rejected because the LMRA does not realize certain purposes which can be fairly
characterized as central to the national scheme. For example, minority-recognition picketing, even though it is held lawful under the statute, produces results incompatible with
the basic statutory purposes. See discussion in text accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
Accordingly, state action which avoids such incongruous results can be fairly said to achieve
federal purposes.
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have nevertheless proposed limitations on pre-emption, which necessarily
involve such distinctions. 71 Such limitations make it clear that our system
has recognized values beyond the quiet life for judges and lawyers.
Finally, an attempt to compromise between the uniformity which flows
from a single source of regulation and the diversity of the federalist idea, by
according to the states exclusive control over the labor relations of smaller
enterprises, is not without its difficulties. It may be a rough and ready way
of exempting small businesses from the burdens of federal regulation and, at
the same time, reducing the regulatory burdens of the national government.
But such exemption frequently ignores that the fundamental purpose of
national regulation is to insure the observance of minimum standards where
the national interest is involved. The size of a particular business-or of its
interstate transactions-is plainly a mechanical formula for determining the
existence of a national interest and the need for national regulation. A more
significant inquiry is the extent to which a class of small businesses is subject
to the abuses which the national law is designed to suppress. 72 In this connection, it is significant that in debating the Taft-Hartley Act, Senator Taft
expressed special concern about the abuses existing in the labor relations of
small enterprises.73 More recently, the McClellan Committee has dramatically
documented the genuine basis for such concern. 74 Under such circumstances,
abdication of national power on the ground that each enterprise is small,
without regard to the cumulative effect of the relevant abuses, may well involve
a perverse surrender of national objectives.
Such surrender will not, moreover, fully achieve the local diversity and
experimentation which the federalist tradition is designed to promote. The
problems of small enterprises are not the same qualitatively as those of larger
entities. Thus, to take only one example, a strike in a small enterprise will
rarely give rise to a local emergency. Consequently, state competence over
small enterprises would not promote the experimentation with arrangements
which might improve our not altogether satisfactory methods for dealing with
disputes which threaten the welfare of local communities or of the whole
country.
71. For example, prior to the Amalgamated decision, Cox urged that the Wisconsin
antistrike regulation be validated despite the difficulty of reconciling such a result with
the language of the O'Brien case. Cox & Seidman, supra note 4, at 240-41. After the
Amalgamated decision, Cox proposed narrowly drawn legislation which would reinstate
state power. Cox, supra note 4, at 1320-21. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fine lines

involved, Cox has also proposed a distinction, for pre-emption purposes, between state
labor regulation "as such," and general regulation which impinges on labor relations.
The problems presented by such a distinction are discussed in text accompanying notes

148-69 iufra.

72. Compare the use of such'a standard by the Supreme Court in determining both

the extent of the commerce power and of the NLRB's statutory jurisdiction in Polish
Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
73. 2 LEGIs. HisT. 1005-07.
74. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 217-21 (1958).
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These somewhat general observations are reinforced by regard for the
character of and the contrast between (a) state regulation bearing on labor
relations and (b) the LMRA. State regulation (pre-emption aside) theoretically constitutes a complete system, with the capacity for growth and adaptation inherent in a mixed statutory and common law system. As indicated
above, it includes regulation, such as labor relations statutes, tailor-made for
labor-management problems. It also includes regulations, such as fair employment practices and safety rules, addressed to the employment relation
without regard to whether that relation is subject only to the discipline afforded
by the market or to collective bargaining as well. It also includes general
tort and contract doctrines and general regulation, such as antitrust and transportation regulation. The application of such general standards to labor relations will in varying degrees reflect the distinctive elements of labormanagement relations.
The substantial problems involved in integrating such a body of regulation with the national scheme will be considered below. 75 Here it is sufficient
to note that uniformity in the regulations controlling labor relations could be
achieved only by displacing a vast body of state regulation directed at ends
and embodying values not explicitly dealt with in the LMRA or its legislative history. The regulatory vacuum which would result from such a singleminded pursuit of uniformity is so extensive and so incompatible with the
federalist tradition as to reinforce the doubts expressed above concerning the
desirability of seeking the uniformity which results from an exclusive system
of federal regulation.
These doubts are further reinforced by a consideration of the substantive
and remedial gaps in the LMRA, which are so serious as to threaten objectives
which can fairly be described as basic to the national scheme. The ouster of
state power, without regard to whether it advances or retards such objectives,
may in concrete situations involve a doctrinaire and perverse application of
the supremacy clause.
The federal-state adjustment with respect to stranger and minority picketing is a useful illustration of such perverse results. Until its recent decision
in Curtis Bros.,76 which was reversed by the District of Columbia Circuit, the
NLRB's position was that stranger or minority picketing for recognition was
not a violation of the LMRA. As a result, an employer subjected to such
picketing was faced with a difficult choice: He could recognize the union,
thereby violating the national act; or he could obey the national law and withhold recognition, thereby in many cases risking the strangulation of the enterprise by picketing. Thus, the federal law prescribed certain standards while it
75. See notes 148-69 infra and accompanying text.
76. Drivers' Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (Curtis Bros.), 119
N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), rev'd sub nor. Drivers Union v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (43
L.R.R.M.) 2156 D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 1958).
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denied protection against conduct deliberately designed to inflict damage for
the purpose of inducing a violation of the governing standards. It is not easy
to see the basis for denying to the states the power to avoid so grotesque a
result by enjoining the picketing in question."7 Such relief would plainly
implement a fundamental policy of the national scheme, namely, that the
bargaining agent should have uncoerced majority support and that individual
78
employees, absent such support, should be free to bargain for themselves.
It is true that if the states were permitted in the first instance to decide
what regulation is a consistent supplement to the federal scheme, error and
impairment of the national purpose would be possible. It is also true that
correction of such errors by the Supreme Court would normally involve such
delays as to be academic with regard to injunctive relief. Nevertheless, where
state injunctions restrain protected activity, the power of the NLRB to restrain their enforcement could be developed, thereby expediting curative
79
relief.
There is no calculus for weighing the danger of such errors against the
difficulties resulting from the destruction of state power to redress the anomalies and gaps in the federal law. But it is at least appropriate to refer to the
familiar danger that "uniformity" and "expertise" and "primary jurisdiction"
may become shibboleths which divert attention from the question whether
state power is deranging or promoting federal purposes.80
77. Total pre-emption yields similar results where the employer, faced with conflicting
representation claims by rival unions, is picketed for immediate recognition by one of
the rivals while the NLRB is processing the rival claims. Although recognition by the
employer has been held to be an unfair labor practice, the picketing has not as yet
been held to be an unfair labor practice. But cf. Drivers' Local 639, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters,
AFL-CIO (Curtis Bros.), supranote 76. Under such circumstances some state courts, prior
to Garner, would relieve the employer from the conflicting pressures of the LMRA and
the picketing by enjoining the picketing. E.g., Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300,
101 N.E.2d 697 (1951).
78. For a discussion of the relationship of the premises of the LMRA and minority
or stranger recognition picketing, see Meltzer, Recognition-OrganizationalPicketing and
Right-to-Work Laws, 9 LAB. L.J. 55 (1958).
79. The Court has denied the jurisdiction of federal district courts to restrain, at the
instance of private parties, the enforcement of state injunctions. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955) (5 to 3 decision). But cf. Capital Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), which sustained the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts to restrain, at the instance of the NLRB, enforcement of state injunctions
after the NLRB has issued a complaint covering the conduct subject to state court
injunction. In Richman Bros., the Court invited efforts by the NLRB to develop methods
for barring enforcement of state injunctions against protected activities, stating that
"it has not yet been determined that, if an employer resorts to a state court in relation
to conduct that is obviously taken over by the Taft-Hartley Act and outside the bounds of
state relief, it may not under appropriate circumstances give ground for a finding of an
unfair labor practice." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., supra, at 520,
citing W. T. Carter & Brother, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950). In Carter, the Board, with
Chairman Herzog dissenting, held that an employer's resort to state court proceedings
to enjoin protected conduct was an unfair labor practice. Even the dissenter recognized
the Board's paramount authority notwithstanding the state injunction and acquiesced in
the Board's order directing the employer to request the state court to vacate the injunction
or modify it to conform to the Board's decision.
80. Compare the general approach of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in UMW v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 76 (1956).
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V. STATE COMPETENCE OVER "VIOLENCE"

"Violence," as used in this context, is a comprehensive term encompassing a broad variety of conduct. It includes not only the application of
physical force to persons and property but also threats of force explicit or
implicit in activities such as mass picketing, and sustained name-calling which
may provoke violence. In view of the controversy as to the proper etiquette
for the picket line and the wide range of activities connected with picketing,
characterization of conduct as "violent" or "peaceful" may involve both
subtle issues of judgment and the risk that the state may lay hands on
conduct which the national board might find to be protected.
The Court's validation of state power over violence despite such risks
is in sharp contrast to its approach in Garner and Weber. The Court has
indicated, without dissent, that state criminal sanctions for violence, incitement
to violence, and intimidation are not displaced by the LMRA. s8 Similarly,
there appears to be full agreement that civil actions, such as personal injury
suits, for what may be termed the direct consequences of violence are unaffected
by the LMRA.8 2 The fighting issues have involved the validity of state
injunctions against violence and of damage remedies for what can be called
the indirect consequences of violence, e.g., loss of profits by an employer or
loss of pay by employees resulting from union threats and intimidation which
prevented nonstrikers from working. As to these matters, a majority of the
Court has recognized state competence, over the persistent dissent of Justices
Black and Douglas, who have been joined intermittently by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren.
The leading case is United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.Corp.,88
in which the Court sustained an employer's recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages against a union. The employer, while under contract with
an AFL union, had rejected the recognition demand of the defendant union,
which had lacked significant employee support. Thereupon, the defendant,
to secure its demand, had resorted to a campaign of violence and intimidation
against the employees involved, thereby forcing the employer to abandon
several construction projects. The state award to the employer for the resultant damages rested on the ground that the defendant had tortiously interfered with plaintiff's advantageous relationships.8 4
Although the Court assumed that the defendant had violated subsection
8(b) (1) (A) of the LMRA, it rejected the contention that Garner foreclosed
81. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64,
669-70 (1954); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).
82. See International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 649 (1958) (Warren,
CJ., dissenting).

83. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
84. 194 Va. 872, 885, 894-95, 75 S.E.2d 694, 703, 709 (1953).
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state action. Its opinion relied principally on three separate, but interrelated,
considerations: (1) "Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any
substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages
for injuries caused by tortious conduct." 8 5 (2) The legislative history plainly
showed that federal proscription of violence was not designed to oust state
law.86 (3) Under common law tort principles, unorganized persons would
have been liable for the loss caused by similar violence; the union, which,
the Court observed, had lacked any contractual relationship with the plaintiff
87
or its employees, was not immunized against similar liability.

The last ground, together with the Court's supporting citations, 88 has
been read as an acceptance of the view that the pre-emption cases do not
oust state laws of general application, as opposed to labor regulation as such,
even though such general laws are applied to non-violent conduct involved
in a labor dispute.8 9 Before examining that interpretation, it is convenient
to consider the post-Laburnum decisions concerning state power over violence.
In UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (the Kohler case), 9°
the Court upheld an order of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
restraining violence and mass picketing, even though the order had been based
on a state labor relations act and had granted a remedy available under the
federal act. The Chief Justice, who had been with the majority in Laburnum,
joined Justices Douglas and Black in dissent. The Court explicitly and
properly disclaimed any concern with whether Wisconsin had acted through its
courts (enforcing a general policy against violence) or through its labor board
(enforcing a policy pin-pointed at labor-management relations). The decisive
consideration was:
85. 347 U.S. at 663-64. The Court referred to the civil liabilities imposed by § 303
of the LMRA, but concluded that that provision, instead of impliedly excluding other
damage recoveries, made it inconsistent to deny recovery for more flagrant conduct, such
as violence. Id. at 665-66.
86. Id. at 668-69. The Court referred to a statement by the late Senator Taft which
approved the duplication of federal and state remedies for violence. This reference has
been criticized on the ground that the Court omitted a prior statement by the Senator
which reflected the assumption that state law did not reach intimidation which fell short
of physical violence. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 213. Bernstein argues that this
assumption, together with the Senator's assumption that there would be federal and state
duplication only in "extreme cases," indicates that the Senator was suggesting only that
the LMRA might duplicate state criminal law. Although there is some ambiguity in the
language relied on by the Court, other portions of the legislative history reflect the
understanding of both proponents and opponents of the statute that the states could deal
with mass picketing and other threats of violence by means of civil remedies. See, e.g.,
2 LEGIs. HisT. 1395-96 (remarks of Senator Taft), 1021.
87. In Laburnum, the Court also urged, in support of state jurisdiction, that private
rather than public rights were being vindicated. 347 U.S. at 665. In Garner, however,
this distinction was dismissed as unimportant. 346 U.S. at 492-500.
88. The Court, 347 U.S. at 669 n.11, cited the following: Cox & Seidman, supra
note 4, at 236; Note, Labor Law-Federal and State Jurisdiction-Common Law
Rentedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 468 (1952).
89. See Cox, Federal-State Jurisdiction Over Labor-Management Relations, in
WISCONSIN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE, TRENDS IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-

TIONs 139, 145-46 (1956).

90. 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
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The States are the natural guardians of the public against
violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear
and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We would not
interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such
emergencies without compelling directions to that effect. 91
In Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,92 the Court held that conduct which
threatened to develop into, or to provoke, violence was also subject to state
injunctive power. In that case, employees struck and picketed to secure
recognition of a union as bargaining agent. Although it was not clear whether
the union had had majority support, the number of strikers at all times fell
short of a majority of the employees. The strike was accompanied by threats
against the plant manager and other forms of misconduct, such as the scattering of tacks on the company parking lot and on the driveways of nonstrikers.
After about two weeks, the recognition strike and picketing ended. About a
month later the strike and picketing resumed as a protest against the employer's
denial of recognition to the union and his refusal to reinstate the strikers.
In its second phase, the strike was accompanied by some acts of violence and
by mounting tension caused in part by sustained and provocative abuse which
the strikers directed at the nonstrikers. According to the findings of the
Arkansas courts, the strikers' conduct was calculated to provoke violence and
was likely to do so unless restrained. Arkansas restrained the strikers and
the union representatives from (1) engaging in threats or intimidation directed
against nonstrikers, obstruction of the streets, etc., and (2) all picketing. The
Court sustained the first phase of the injunction (with the Chief Justice and
Justices Black and Douglas dissenting), but invalidated the injunction insofar
as it restrained peaceful picketing, as an encroachment on "the pre-empted
93
domain of the National Labor Relations Board.
In sustaining Arkansas' power to prevent prospective violence, the Court
explicitly and necessarily rejected the contention that the strikers' conduct
was protected.94 This determination marked the first occasion since BriggsStratton in which the Court overcame its unwillingness to rule in the first
instance that conduct was unprotected where NLRA precedents left doubt
as to the proper characterization of the conduct.95 This approach will prob91. Id. at 274-75.
92. 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
93. Id. at 139.
94. The Court, in rejecting the contention that the concerted activities were protected,
cited Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), thereby creating some
ambiguity as to whether it was concerned with protection of free speech under the fourteenth amendment or the protection conferred by the LMRA. It seems fair, however, to
read the opinion as dealing with statutory protection.
95. Under the Board's precedents, the threats and minor vandalism of the strikers
were clearly unprotected, but their abusive language, which the Court indicated could be
restrained, raised a different question. See NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co., 206
F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953), modifying 100 N.L.R.B. 301, 304 (1952).
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ably be confined to the context of actual or incipient violence. Nevertheless,
Rainfair will probably be invoked to support state jurisdiction to enjoin
peaceful conduct unprohibited and unprotected by federal law, in accordance
with the Briggs-Strattonrationale.
In International Union, UAW v. Russell,96 which soon became a cause
cgl~bre, the Court recognized state power to grant to individual employees
remedies similar to the employer remedies which had been sanctioned by
Laburnum. The Court, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting
and Mr. Justice Black not participating, sustained an Alabama verdict requiring a union to pay compensatory damages of about 500 dollars (for lost pay)
plus 9,500 dollars in punitive damages to a nonstriking employee whose entry
into a strike-bound plant had been blocked by mass picketing and threats of
violence. The action had been based on the tort of wrongful interference
with a lawful occupation.
The Court assumed, arguendo, that subsection 10(c) of the LMRA
authorized the NLRB to award lost pay to Russell, notwithstanding Board
precedents disclaiming such remedial power. The assumed availability of such
compensatory relief, the Court conceded, differentiated Russell from Laburnum,
where the Board had lacked the authority to make the employer whole. The
Court refused, however, to make this difference decisive, for the following
reasons: Congress had not established "a general scheme authorizing the
Board to award full compensatory damages for injuries caused by wrongful
conduct." 7 The primary legislative purpose had been "to stop and prevent
unfair labor practices"; the Board's power under subsection 10(c) to compensate for lost pay was thus incidental to a scheme of dominantly preventive
relief.98 Lost pay, even for victims of unfair labor practices, was not a matter
of right but depended on the Board's discretion. The overlap of federal and
state compensatory remedies did not create the "conflict of remedies referred
to in Laburnun." 99 Previous pre-emption cases reflected only a concern that
"one forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which the other forum would
find legal, or that the state courts would restrict the . . . rights guaranteed
by the Federal Acts."' 00
The dissenters urged, first, that under the majority's assumption that
compensatory relief was provided by the LMRA, there was a duplication
between federal and state remedies, which was inconsistent with the rationale
of Garner. The dissenters did not, however, rest on the assumed scope of the
Board's remedial authority. They adopted an extremely broad view of federal
96. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
97. Id. at 643.
98. Id. at 642-43.
99. Id. at 644.
100. Ibid.
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pre-emption, which would deny the states the power to grant damages for the
indirect economic consequences of violence even though the NLRB also lacked
such power. Their argument proceeded as follows: "The Federal Act represents an attempt to balance the competing interests of employee, union and
management. By providing additional remedies the States may upset that
balance as effectively as by frustrating or duplicating existing ones." 10 1 Such
remedies, varying especially in their punitive aspects from state to state,
would destroy the uniform scheme of national regulation, which the LMRA
was designed to achieve. The threat of varying damages was also inconsistent
with the statutory objective of promoting industrial peace. The prospect of
lucrative punitive relief would deter recourse to the "curative" federal machinery, and private litigation would, as the dissent in Laburnum had emphasized,
drag on, "keeping old wounds open. 10° 2 This language can scarcely be reconciled with the result or the reasoning in Laburnum, a decision in which the
Chief justice, who now spoke for the dissenters, had joined.
The dissenters, sensitive to the difficulties posed by Laburnum and unwilling to distinguish it by conceding the Board's authority to award lost
pay, pointed to three other grounds of distinction: (1) Since an employee's
abstention from concerted activities is protected by Section 7 of the LMRA,
the union's interference with the nonstriking employee in Russell directly and
inherently involved a violation of subsection 8(b) (1) (A), whereas that subsection had been involved only "fortuitously" in the union's interference with
the employer's interest in Laburnum. (2) Since the defendant union in
Russell had been the certified bargaining representative, its conduct was an
incident of an ordinary economic dispute which would, presumably, be followed
by continuing labor-management relations. In Laburnum, per contra, the
defendant union had been a stranger attempting to displace an incumbent union
by "predatory" coercion of both the employees and the employer. There was,
accordingly, no prospect of continuing relations between the litigants and no
need to consider the possibility that litigation might prejudice such relations.
(3) Finally, in Laburnum, only one plaintiff, the employer, could recover
punitive damages; whereas all of the many employees affected by the conduct
in Russell could successively recover punitive damages, a prospect aggravated
by the Alabama rule that evidence of a previous punitive recovery was inadmissible in a subsequent action.
There are obvious difficulties in reconciling the position of either the
majority or the dissent with the Court's precedents. Furthermore, comment
on the separate opinions is complicated by the fact that they proceeded on
different assumptions regarding the NLRB's remedial authority. As for the
majority opinion, the distinguishing of Garner and related cases solely on the
101. Id. at 650 (dissenting opinion).
102. Id. at 654 (dissenting opinion).
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ground that they involved preventive, rather than damage, relief is questionable. As Judge Traynor has urged with characteristic insight, state damage
actions, like injunctions, enforce policy'and control conduct albeit somewhat
more indirectly.103 In addition, they involve the possibility of the same kinds
of conflict which the broad language of Garner apparently was designed to
suppress. 10 Thus, states purporting to apply substantive standards identical
to those embodied in the federal scheme may because of diverse attitudes and
procedures reach different results in particular cases. Moreover, state damage
remedies may be imposed for conduct which might be held protected under
the federal scheme, and the possibility of such awards would operate to restrain activities which the LMRA, as previously interpreted by the Court, was
said to free from all restraints. If an adequate compensatory remedy is supplied by the federal act, it is not easy to see any special justification for running
the risks of state adjudications which would overlap or conflict with the
federal scheme.
Nor is any convincing argument for such state action (given the premises
of Garner) supplied by the Court's attempt to minimize the importance of the
compensatory remedy which it assumed was provided by the LMRA. Even
though damage remedies under the LMRA are "incidental" to a scheme of
dominantly preventive relief and even though they are entrusted to the
Board's discretion, these considerations do not affect the impact of the Board's
compensatory powers on conduct or the potentiality of conflict between state
and federal action. Indeed, in many situations it is the fear of back pay liability which is the decisive deterrent to unfair labor practices since the NLRB's
purely preventive processes give wrongdoers one free bite.
In view of the presence of violence in Russell, the Court's broad distinction between damage and injunctive relief was plainly not necessary for the
decision. Violence and related conduct, as Garner0 5 and other cases suggest,1 6 present a special case. The paramount responsibility of the states for
dealing with violence, the importance of recognizing power adequate to responsibility, and the pertinent legislative history 107 appear to justify the recogni-

tion of state power over actual or incipient violence despite a potential overlap
or conflict between state and federal regulation.
The Court in Russell did not, however, make it clear that violence is a
special case. Its narrow reading of previous pre-emption cases may be interpreted as a general authorization of state damage actions without regard to
103. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 619-20, 320 P.2d
473, 488 (Traynor, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
104. See id. at 618, 320 P.2d at 487 (dissenting opinion).
105. See 346 U.S. at 488.
106. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 667-68 (1954).
107. See note 86 .tupra and accompanying .text.
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whether violence is involved or whether such actions are necessary to fill
remedial gaps in the federal scheme. Such state power would naturally be
limited so as to exclude encroachment on protected activities. It should be
observed, however, that the opinion, by stressing the "kind of conduct... involved, 1 0 8 suggests that the departure from Garner may well be confined to
situations involving violence.
The extent to which Garner should be limited in actions for damages,
as opposed to injunctive relief, can more conveniently be explored below. At
this point, it is sufficient to note that the special history and characteristics of
the injunction in labor disputes might serve to justify a distinction, for preemption purposes, between damage and injunction cases. Labor's hostility to
the labor injunction resulted in part from the fact that the consequences of an
erroneous injunction often could not be reversed by a successful appeal because
changes in the circumstances underlying the dispute precluded resumption
of strikes or picketing. A reversal of erroneous damage awards could, however, come closer to restoring the status quo.
As for the dissenting opinion in Russell, its major premise that any additional state remedy would destroy the balance in labor relations which Congress sought to create involves a somewhat cavalier treatment of both the legislative purpose imputed to Congress by Laburnum and the underlying questions
of policy. Congress, according to Laburnum, had been unwilling to oust state
remedies for violence and had not in that connection suggested a distinction between state damage remedies for violence, as such, and those for its economic
consequences. There are, moreover, strong considerations against such fragmentation of state competence-considerations which are particularly forceful
if, as the dissenters apparently assumed, the federal scheme does not provide for
compensatory relief in the Russell situation. The primary responsibility of states
for dealing with violence is a familiar aspect of our federalist tradition. For
this purpose, "civil responsibilty and public punishment by common usage have
long been established as appropriate and complementary associates."' 09 Indeed, in labor disputes, civil liability is on occasion a more effective deterrent
than the criminal law. Prosecutors may be reluctant to take action because
of inertia, sympathy with the strikers, or political indebtedness to the interests
involved. Juries may be unwilling to convict individuals whose wrongdoing
occurred in the surcharged atmosphere of a labor controversy, but may be
willing to grant compensatory relief against an impersonal association. Such
108. 356 U.S. at 642. A narrow area for state competence over tort actions is also

suggested by the summary of Laburnum contained in both International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958), and the Weber case, 348 U.S. at 477.
109. Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 465, 154 N.E. 309, 311
(1926). See generally Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma ih Labor Board Cases, 59
HAiv. L. Rxv. 720, 734-37 (1946); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27
HAav. L. REv. 317 (1914).
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reluctance may be especially strong when violence has not actually erupted
into physical attack but, as in the case of mass picketing and related techniques,
is implicit in the total situation. An assumption of a "federal balance," which
gains no support from either the legislative history or the general traditions
of federalism, scarely justifies the denial of state power to employ civil actions
as a device for deterring violence and compensating its victims.
The dissenters' argument, pushed to the limits of its logic, would not
merely fragment state power over violence in labor disputes but would destroy it completely. State criminal statutes, if they are enforced, involve
dangers similar to those implicit in civil remedies. They bring diverse local
attitudes and procedures to bear on conduct occurring in the context of labor
controversies. They also involve the risk that activities which might be protkted under the national scheme might be made "too risky to undertake."
Furthermore, the institution and prosecution of criminal actions may also
poison a continuing relationship. In short, the considerations urged by the
dissenters to support the ouster of state civil remedies-notwithstanding the
remedial deficiencies of the federal scheme-equally support the ouster of state
criminal sanctions.
The basic difficulties with the dissent arise, in my opinion, from a onesidedness in striking a balance between the interests at stake. The dissenters
appeared to be so preoccupied with a contingent and remote limitation on the
union's protected activities that they neglected the actual and direct interference with Russell's protected activities. Presumably, it was this one-sided
emphasis which led the dissenters to urge in effect that measurable economic
loss deliberately inflicted by violence and intimidation in violation of both
federal and state laws should currently not be compensable under either system.
Such a self-defeating jurisprudence, which might be read as an encouragement to violence in the context of labor-management relations, would scarcely
promote the search for orderly adjustments in that context or in other contexts
where law is challenged by force.
A similar preoccupation with a single interest underlies the dissenters'
fears that state remedies for violence would disturb a continuing labormanagement relationship. The fostering of a proper climate for such relationships is, of course, an important objective of labor policy. But it is a familiar
point that employees and employers as well as unions are parties to that
relationship. Disregard of, or inadequate remedies for, union violence against
employees or employers may in some situations appear to avoid strains on the
tripartite relationship. But in other situations violent conduct which might
have been checked by appropriate deterrents may generate such strains.
Whatever the uses and dangers of appeasement in this context, both
federal and state law have proscribed violence. The federal act implies, moreover, that the risks of disturbing continuing relationships are a justifiable
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cost of avoiding abuses by the interests involved. Thus any charge that an
incumbent union has violated the LMRA may disturb such a relationship.
Furthermore, section 301 of the LMRA provides for liability for breach of collective bargaining agreements, and section 303, for violations of the restrictions
imposed on unions by the provisions of subsection 8(b) (4) of the act. The
enforcement of such liabilities is not without risks to continuing relationships.
The dissenting opinion does not make it clear why similar risks should become
intolerable where liability for the economic consequences of violence is
involved.
The dissenters' specific grounds for distinguishing Russell from Laburnum
are no more convincing than their general approach to federal-state power
over acts of violence. First, even if the protection against violence afforded
to an employee by subsection 8(b) (1) (A) is "direct" and the employer's
protection "derivative," these labels do not suggest that an employee should
be deprived of adequate compensatory relief. Indeed, the contrary conclusion
seems more acceptable. Congressional preoccupation with the employees'
rights scarcely warrants the destruction of their compensatory remedies while
"compensatory relief" for employers is preserved. Secondly, the fact that the
defendant union in Russell was certified whereas the defendant in Laburnum
was a stranger attempting to displace the incumbent, although it plainly made
the conduct in Laburnum more distasteful, scarcely serves as a basis for a
legal distinction. Neither Labur-num nor the LMRA suggests that that fact
should destroy all compensatory relief for violence clearly prohibited by federal
as well as state law. 110
The final difference between Russell and Laburnum urged by the dissenters, the prospect of multiple punitive damage awards in Russell, is an
appealing basis for distinguishing the cases. But it is difficult to convert that
difference into an acceptable basis for a legal distinction, however desirable
it may be as a matter of policy to exclude punitive damages from this area.
If, as Laburnum indicated, state compensatory and punitive remedies for
violence and its consequences are valid, one of the familiar risks of recognizing
state power under a federalist scheme is that it will be exercised harshly or
unwisely. But neither the pre-emption cases nor the commerce clause provides
110. It should be observed that the arrangements with the incumbent union in the
Laburnum case provided for exclusive hiring of skilled workers through AFL unions
and for the unions' consent to the hiring of unorganized unskilled workers. 347 U.S. at
660 n.4. The arrangement, which appeared to contemplate either a closed shop or the
preferential hiring of unionized workers, was illegal under the LMRA. This consideration should not affect the validity of the result in Laburnum since violent self-help to
remedy violations is scarcely justifiable in iev of the orderly remedies afforded by the
LMRA. But cf. Bernstein, sipra note 4, at 211-12. Nevertheless, the probable illgality of the arrangements between the incumbent unions and the employer in Laburnum
is an additional reason for questioning the force attached by the dissenters to the fact
that an incumbent union as well as the employer was the object of the rival union's
violence in Laburnum.
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the yardsticks for measuring the validity of successive penalties for conduct
which may, but need not, be considered a single transaction. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment would appear to be more relevant. Furthermore, similar risks of multiple punitive sanctions exist where an employee
brings an action for personal injuries inflicted by violence during a labor
dispute or for the fear caused by the threat of such violence, or where the
state charges a union or its officers with multiple criminal offenses. The dissenters, as already indicated, appeared to concede state competence over such
actions,"' including, presumably, competence to grant successive punitive damage awards. Such damage awards, despite differences in the underlying legal
concepts, would have substantially the same impact on labor-management
relations as the award in Russell. It is, accordingly, extremely difficult to
articulate a coherent concept of pre-emption which would warrant the dis2
tinction drawn by the dissent between the two types of awards."1
111. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
112. The overlapping state and federal jurisdiction recognized in Russell may give

rise to troublesome questions as to the-effect in an NLRB proceeding of a prior state
judgment and the effect in a state proceeding of a prior NLRB determination. This
footnote, which is not based on a comprehensive examination of the authorities, is
designed only to raise such questions.
A state determination that a union's conduct was violent would not appear to be
binding in a subsequent Board proceeding arising from a charge that the employer had
violated the LMRA by disciplining employ'ees who had participated in the assertedly
non-violent activities. Under familiar doctrines concerning collateral estoppel, the General Counsel of the NLRB, not having b-een a party to, or in control of, the state
litigation, would not be bound by the state judgment, quite apart from questions which
might exist concerning the identity of issues. Cf. New York State Labor Relations
Bd. v. Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 48.9-95, 63 N.E.2d 68, 72-75 (1945). Furthermore, collateral estoppel of the NLRB would appear to be precluded by LMRA § 10(a),
which states that the Board's powers shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment. Cf. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand,
J.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955), 55 CoLUmt. L. Rav. 1078. But cf. Vanderveer v.
Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956).
Nevertheless, Judge Magruder has suggested, without deciding, that "a holding
that the Board is bound by the findings in the state injunction proceeding might perhaps be justified" in that it might "facilitate the reestablishment of labor stability in the
disrupted plant!' NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1954). Despite
the force of Judge Magruder's comments, the provisions of § 10 (a) and the importance
attached by the Supreme Court to uniform and centralized administration of the LMRA
make it unlikely that conventional requirements of collateral estoppel would be relaxed
so as to give binding effect in an' NLRB pi-o.ceeding to prior state determinations which
are invoked against the Board.
More troublesome is the problem presented by the converse situation, i.e., whether
an explicit or implicit Board determination that conduct is protected is binding in a state
proceeding arising out of a claim that the conduct in question was violent, unprotected,
and therefore within the state's jurisdiction. Even though the party asserting the state
claim had been the complainant before the Board, the fact that control of Board proceedings is vested in the General Counsel would appear to negate the "privity" generally
required for collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, in the light of Garner, it would be strange
to permit a state to award damages for conduct previously characterized as protected by
the Board. Garner pre-empted state jurisdiction in part to avoid the possibility of state
interference with activities which might be found by the Board to be protected. To
sanction state action against conduct previously characterized as protected by the Board
would thus appear to be incompatible with the purposes behind Garner and other preemption cases. But due process considerations, as well as orthodox collateral estoppel
requirements, would present serious obstacles to a holding that a party to a state proceeding is bound by a previous characterization of conduct in a national proceeding to which

HeinOnline -- 59 Colum. L. Rev. 35 1959

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

State competence over violence and "trespass" are related because of
the impact of property violations on public order. In Fairlawn,"3 the Court
expressly reserved the trespass question. But decisions involving unfair labor
practices make it plain that "property rights" are limited by the need to
protect the employees' statutory rights.11 4 There will doubtlessly be a similar
accommodation in equitable and legal actions for trespass. Such actions will
raise a troublesome issue, viaz., the extent to which the Court will relax its
fluctuating and unrealizable requirement of primary interpretation by the
Board. The connection between trespass and violence suggests that the Court's
disregard of this requirement in the violence cases may carry over into the
trespass situation. But an important consideration against such a result consists of the greater difficulties involved in accommodating property "rights"
with the "rights" protected by section 7. These difficulties may impel the
Court to protect the Board's primary interpretation at the expense of another
traditional area of state responsibility. Here, as in other contexts, the issue
is whether the theoretical possibility of conflict should result in the regulatory
and remedial vacuum which would follow the displacement of state power.
Supplementing the general considerations already urged against such a result
is the point that employees whose statutory rights are invaded may secure
relief through the Board, 115 whereas employers whose property rights are
invaded would be deprived of any preventive relief by pre-emption.
he was not a party. Such obstacles might be avoided, however, on the ground that the
national government, which could completely oust state jurisdiction, can so condition its
exercise as to avoid encroachment on activities determined by the NLRB to be protected.
Such an approach would in turn invite the contention that an unconstitutional condition
was being imposed on state jurisdiction. Prediction in this situation is obviously hazardous. But national characterization of conduct may well be held controlling in a subsequent
state proceeding in order to implement the purposes implicit in the pre-emption decisions.
In any event, the exercise of state jurisdiction in such situations will, of course, be subject
to review by the Supreme Court if it is urged that the state action encroaches on protected
activities.
Interesting complications also arise where a prior Board or state determination is
offered against a party to the earlier proceeding. For example, a finding by the Board that
a union, defendant in a Board proceeding, was guilty of violence may be offered against
that union when it is defending a state action for damages. The absence of mutuality
would not in some jurisdictions preclude a holding that the defendant in the state action
is bound by the prior Board determination. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rxv. 281 (1957). Nevertheless, a state
might reject such a result on the ground that it would be incompatible with its "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the cause of action involved. Cf. Lyons v. Westinghouse Corp., supra.
Federal jurisdiction in diversity actions over such state-created rights could be reconciled
with the claims of the states' "exclusive jurisdiction" on the ground that a federal court,
under the Erie doctrine, is an arm of state law.
In the converse situation, the Board would appear to be prevented by § 10(a) from
binding a defendant in a Board proceeding by a finding against him as a defendant in an
earlier state proceeding.
113. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24-25
(1957); cf. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 744, 749 (1942) (upholding Wisconsin order which
restrained not only mass picketing and intimidation, but also picketing of employees'
homes).
114. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
115. See ibid; Capital Serv., Inc., v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
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VI. STATE DAMAGES FOR NON-VIOLENT CONDUCT

The uncertainties flowing from Garner and Weber, which divided the
Court in Russell and Gonzales, also complicate state competence over damage
actions for non-violent conduct. The difficulties involved are suggested by
the Garmon litigation in California. In Gar-Mon, the Supreme Court expressly
reserved the question of state competence to grant damages for peaceful picketing for recognition and a union shop, by a union which lacked majority support."16 After remand, the California Supreme Court, in a four to three
decision, sustained the damage award, relying principally on the Laburnum
decision."17 Judge Traynor, in dissent, properly urged that Garmon, because it
did not involve violence, was critically different from Laburnum. Reading
Laburnum against the background of Garner,he concluded that California had
been ousted of jurisdiction.
There is a strong basis for Judge Traynor's argument. If the picketing
for some or all of the purposes involved is not a federal violation, the state
damage award impairs the national policy by restraining conduct "designed
to be free" of any obstruction. If, per contra, the picketing is federally
prohibited, the state grant of a damage remedy not provided by the national
scheme would derange it far more than the parallel remedy which was invalidated in Garner. Furthermore, state characterization of the conduct prior
to NLRB action runs counter to the NLRB's duty of "primary interpretation and application" which was accorded such great importance in Garner.
A requirement of primary interpretation in the circumstances of Garmon is,
of course, particularly bizarre given the Board's refusal, because of selfimposed jurisdictional limitations, to process the employer's charge. But this
anomaly is a general consequence of Guss rather than of the denial of state
competence to grant damages.
Although the general argument outlined above has not only Judge
Traynor's impressive support but also that of able commentators," i8 it involves substantial difficulties. The first set of difficulties arises from the fact
that the minority-recognition picketing was coupled with a demand for a union
shop. As a consequence, the picketing constituted not only a violation by the
union of Subsection 8(b) (2) of the LMRA but also an attempt by it to force
the employer into a violation of subsection 8(a) (2). But more important, the
demand for a union shop requires consideration of the implications of Subsection 14(b) of the LMRA and its legislative history.
116. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957).
117. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 603, 320 P.2d 473,
478, cert. granted, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
118. See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957,
44 VA. L. R.v. 1057, 1065-74 (1958); Hays, State Courts and Federal Preemption,
23 Mo. L. REv. 373, 396-97 (1958).

HeinOnline -- 59 Colum. L. Rev. 37 1959

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 59

There is a strong argument, elaborated below," 9 that the state authority
sanctioned by that subsection should extend not only to consummated union
shop arrangements illegal under a state law but also to antecedent pressures
designed to achieve such arrangements. If this argument is granted, Garinon
raises the question whether such antecedent pressures should be subject to state
authority even though a state, instead of broadly condemning union shops
and pressures to achieve them, lays down a narrower prohibition applicable
to picketing for a union shop only where the union lacks a majority.
There is nothing in the LMRA or in a coherent concept of federalism
which would warrant a recognition of state competence to enforce the broader
prohibition, but a denial of competence to enforce the narrower one. 120 Such a
distinction would, indeed, grotesquely pervert the principle of majority support embodied generally in the LMRA and particularly in its regulation of
union security arrangements.
Reliance on Garner to deny state jurisdiction in Garinon raised a second
and a more important set of difficulties, which would exist even in a case not
involving a demand for a union shop clause. It is appropriate, because of the
uncertain status of the Board's Curtis decision, to examine these difficulties
on alternative assumptions as to the ultimate fate of the Board's doctrine that
picketing for recognition in the absence of majority support violates the
LMRA.
If the Supreme Court approves that doctrine, state competence in situations such as Garner should, I believe, be sustained. Stranger or minority
picketing for recognition is, as indicated above, incompatible with the basic
objectives and provisions of the national law. Although the LMRA would
proscribe such conduct, it would not afford employers a compensatory
remedy for the economic losses which are the object and the result of the
union's conduct. Consequently, only the states can now provide adequate
compensation for the deliberate infliction of economic loss by conduct which
violates both state and federal law. Furthermore, the delay surrounding preventive relief through the processes of the national board increases the need
for civil liability as an adjunct to the Board's preventive relief. These considerations make the case for state competence in the Garmon situation even
stronger than in the Russell situation where the Court assumed that the
119. See notes 125-47 infra and accompanying text.

120. The California court did not clearly indicate that the union shop demand
entered into its proscription of the picketing. The union's objective was held illegal under
California law because it would "require the plaintiffs to interfere with the bargaining
rights of their employees and force upon them terms and conditions of their employment
and labor representation not of their own choosing and which in fact they had rejected."
49 Cal. 2d at 607, 320 P.2d at 480. Despite California's failure to pin-point the significance
of the union shop demand, its existence could properly be considered in a Supreme Court
ruling on state power. This is especially appropriate because the failure of California
to emphasize that demand is attributable to the Supreme Court's precedents concerning
§ 14(b), which, it is suggested below, ignore the purpose and history of that section.
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federal law provided adequate money damages and where the complication
of multiple claims for punitive damages existed.
Judge Traynor has, however, properly urged that permitting state
damage awards in the absence of violence involves a greater danger of
erroneous decisions by state courts attempting to distinguish between prohibited and protected conduct. 1' 1 Several persuasive reasons suggest, however, that this consideration does not warrant the destruction of state
competence to grant damages for non-violent but federally prohibited activities where such competence is necessary for an adequate compensatory
scheme. First, there is a similar danger in the violence context, namely, that
of disparate federal and state findings and characterization of facts as well as
disparate approaches to elusive issues of vicarious responsibility. A more
important consideration is the implication of Section 303 of the LMRA that
Congress was prepared to tolerate such differences where they are the price
of an adequate compensatory scheme. Section 303 expressly authorizes state
and federal courts to award damages for violations of subsection 8(b)(4)
of the act.122 The jurisdiction of the courts is, moreover, independent of the
Board's. As a result, the same conduct may be held to be unprohibited, and
impliedly protected, by the Board and yet may be the basis of a damage
award in the court action. 2 3 It is true that to the extent that such conflicts
result from different interpretations of the federal statute, state application
of section 303 could be harmonized with federal adjudications by the exercise
of the Supreme Court's reviewing power. But the Court could not reach
conflicts resulting from reasonable differences in fact determination, and provisions such as section 303 which turn on "purpose" are, of course, a fruitful
source of such conflicts. Furthermore, the Supreme Court could exercise its
reviewing authority to strike down damage awards based on state law if
such awards encroach on federally protected activities. Such review would
inescapably involve the possibilities of federal and state conflict, but, like
the conflict arising from section 303, which is not fundamentally different, it

121. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 615, 618-19, 320

P.2d 473, 485, 487-88 (1958).

122. The express provision for jurisdiction in § 303 invites the inclusio unius argument. But that argument is far from persuasive. That section's provision for judicial
remedies reflected the strong congressional disapproval of the secondary and other
pressures proscribed in § 8(b) (4) of the LMRA. The explicit provision in LMRA for
state and federal competence over damage actions for conduct deemed particularly
obnoxious by the Congress indicates only that damages were to be granted for such
conduct despite varying state rules as to the legality of such conduct. It does not indicate
that all other state damage remedies for non-violent conduct were to be ousted regardless
of the impact of the conduct on the federal purposes and the remedial gaps in the federal
scheme. Plainly, both Laburnum and Russell reject any mechanical inclusio unius argument based on § 303.
123. See International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952) ; United Brick Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
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should be dismissed as the price for adequate remedies against conduct banned
by both state and federal law.
The alternative assumption concerning Curtis, viz., that minority picketing for recognition will be lawful under the LMRA, would make the recognition of state competence in the Garmon situation considerably more troublesome. The states would then be awarding damages for activities which arc
neither prohibited nor protected. In this context, there is more force to the
claim that state additions to the substantive, as opposed to the remedial, law
of labor relations would derange the balance struck by the federal act. If,
in accordance with Garner, the interest in centralized and uniform interpretation precludes the states from granting parallel remedies for activity
apparently prohibited by federal law, it would appear, a fortiori, that the
states are barred from applying additional substantive standards and thereby
limiting conduct ungoverned by the national act. But before that plausible
argument can be accepted, the reasons for denying group activities the protection of the statute must be considered. Such protection is in general
denied because the conduct involved is deemed incompatible with the objectives of the LMRA, or of some other federal statute, or with notions of the
mutual responsibilities of employer and employee, or because the unprotected conduct invades an employer interest considered paramount. The fact
that such marginal activities are denied the statutory protection may be read
either as a declaration of national neutrality with respect to supplementary
state power or as a declaration that the states also should abstain from
regulation.
The general problems underlying the choice involved may be illustrated
by reference to a concrete situation. A union may picket or exert other pressures to obtain recognition despite the fact that a rival union also is claiming
majority status and the Board is processing the representation question. If
an employer grants recognition because of the picketing, he violates the LMRA.
If, in obedience to the national law, he withholds recognition, he runs
the risk of substantial losses as a result of the union's pressures. The national
board, pending the election, presumably cannot move to enjoin the picketing ;12
in any event, its processes may be too slow to grant effective protection. State
injunctive power is at least subject to the uncertainties flowing from Garner,
and is probably foreclosed. If employees participated in the picketing, the
employer would, of course, have the theoretical right to discharge them. But
that right may be a paper right either because the employer cannot secure
employees with requisite skills or because discharge would aggravate a tense
situation.
124. The reasoning of Drivers Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (Curtis
Bros.), 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), rev'd vib zom. Drivers Union v. NLRB, 2 LAI. REL.
REP. (43 L.R.R.M.) 2156 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 1958, might be extended to deal with this
situation.
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Under the foregoing circumstances, the recognition of state competence
to grant damages would serve substantially the purpose which lies behind
the characterization of the employee's activities as unprotected, i.e., it would
to some extent deter such conduct. State damage awards would, moreover,
be implementing a central purpose of the national scheme by protecting the
integrity of the Board's representation machinery as well as the principle of
majority rule.
It is true that the foregoing considerations could also be urged to support
state injunctive relief in the situation described above. Nevertheless, Russell,
albeit in a context of violence, drew a distinction between damages and injunctive relief; a distinction which is supported by the fact that damage awards
encroaching on protected activities are more amenable to effective correction
than erroneous injunctions. Furthermore, Laburnum emphasized the absence
of "conflict" between the state remedy and federal administrative relief. These
considerations suggest the slim possibility that the battered principle of BriggsStratton may be revived in the context of actions for damages.
VII.

UNION SECURITY PROVISIONS, INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS,
AND RELATED MATTERS

The Wagner Act did not affirmatively sanction or prohibit the closed shop
or other forms of union security arrangements. Although the act was silent
as to state authority, its legislative history indicated that the states were to
retain authority to prohibit or regulate such arrangements. 125 Subsection 14(b)
of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly empowers the states to prohibit union
security arrangements which, in the absence of state regulation, would be
permitted by section 8 of the statute.' 26 The legislative history of subsection
14(b) suggests that its purpose was not merely to sanction state regulations
more restrictive than the federal prohibitions, but rather to preserve concurrent
state regulation without regard to whether it supplemented or overlapped the
federal scheme. 127 In other words, the legislative history indicates that subsection 14(b) was designed to preserve for the states the same power to deal
125. Relevant extracts are set forth in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 307-10 (1949).

126. Subsection 14(b) might be read as bringing into play the federal prohibition
against discrimination embodied in §§ 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of the LMRA when union
shop arrangements violate state law. But the proviso to § 8(a) (3) interposes technical
obstacles to such an interpretation. It provides that "nothing in this Act or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making" union
security agreements which conform to the requirements imposed by Taft-Hartley. Furthermore, the legislative history of § 14(b) suggests that it was not designed to incorporate
state law into the LMRA, but only to authorize state invalidation of union security
agreements permitted by the LMRA.
127. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), which, after amendments, became the
LMRA, provided in § 13 that union security arrangements were "divested of their
character as a subject of regulation by Congress under its power to regulate commerce
...to the extent that such agreements shall, in addition to being subject to any applicable
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with union security arrangements which they had under the Wagner Act.12 8
The Court has not, however, explicitly recognized the unique problems

posed by subsection 14(b) and the pertinent legislative history. Its early
treatment of state power in this area proceeded on the assumption which
underlay Garner,namely, that overlap between federal and state remedies was
fatal to state competence. Thus, as indicated above, 129 Plankinton,a per curiam
decision, denied state authority to grant affirmative relief from union security
arrangements violating state law where such relief duplicated remedies available under the LMRA. Furthermore, the Court's later explanation of Plankinton implied that the states were barred from granting relief of any kind for
conduct discriminating against nonunion (or union) employees if such conduct
30
constituted a federal unfair labor practice.1
The recent Gonzales case131 introduced new uncertainties concerning state
action which involves such a partial or complete remedial overlap. In Gonzales,
the Court, divided as in Russell, affirmed a California decision restoring the
plaintiff to union membership from which he had been expelled and awarding
him damages for lost pay and for physical and mental suffering. In the California litigation, the plaintiff had relied on the doctrine that a union constituprovisions of this Act, be subject to the operation and effect of such state laws and constitutional provisions as well." 1 LEGIS. HisT. 80-81. See also H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34, 44 (1947), 1 LEGIS. HIST. 325, 335. The final version of § 14(b)
was agreed to in the course of conference to reconcile the House bill with the Senate
bill which did not contain a corresponding provision. The House conference report
stated: "It was never the intention of the National Labor Relations Act ... to preempt
the field . . . so as to deprive the States of their powers to prevent compulsory unionism.
... To make certain that there should be no question about this, section 13 was included
in the House bill. The conference agreement, in Section 14(b), contains a provision having
the same effect." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1947), 1 Laois. HxST.
564. Subsequently, in the debates, Senator Ball referred to the provisions embodied in
§ 14(b) as "new" and to "the compromise in the House on language spelling it out."
2 LEGIS. HIsT. 1546. Senator Taft replied: "The Senate committee report stated on its
face that State laws would still remain in effect. All we have done is to write in
expressly what our committee report said." Ibid. No statement in the Senate committee
report, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1 LEGIS. HIST. 407-504, has been
found which has the tenor suggested by Senator Taft. See id. at 6, 1 LEcis. HisT. 412-13,
which Senator Taft apparently had in mind. See also 2 LEGIS. HIsT. 1596-97. Nevertheless, his statement on the floor is wholly consistent with concurrent state power, and
the statement in the Senate committee report is not inconsistent with such power.
128. Senator Taft stated that the LMRA did not "in any way prohibit the enforcement
of State laws which already prohibited closed shops." 2 LEaIs. HIsT. 1597. Although
"closed shops" are technically distinguishable from Taft-Hartley union shops, the legislative history, summarized above, suggests that the quoted phrase was not being used as
a word of art.
My own views on the proper interpretation of § 14(b) are not unconsciously shaped
by any liking for "right-to-work" laws, which I have criticized elsewhere. Meltzer,
supra note 78, at 62.
129. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 45 supra. It should be noted, however, that the
Court, relying on the legislative history to justify its departure from the literal language
of § 14(b), has sanctioned state regulations which, instead of prohibiting union security
arrangements, imposed requirements supplementing those imposed by the LMRA. See
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301,
314 (1949). The NLRB, in at least one case, appears, however, to have neglected the
implications of this decisiQn. Cyclone Sales, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 431 (1956).
131. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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tion constitutes a "contract"'132 between the union and its membership and had
urged that under state law he was entitled to botl restoration of membership
and damages as a remedy for the union's breach of that contract through
wrongful expulsion. The Court, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, confirmed state
power over membership rights-a point conceded by the dissenters and the
defendant. Turning to the disputed issue-state power to grant damages for
loss of employment resulting from the plaintiff's expulsion-the Court, in
sustaining state competence, emphasized three grounds: (1) the crux of the
California action was breach of contract; (2) it was desirable to afford the
plaintiff a complete remedy for the invasion of his rights; and (3) the facts
raised "doubts" (which the dissenters properly considered exaggerated) as
33
to the availability of a federal remedy for the lost pay.'
The dissenters reiterated the principal points of the Russell dissent:
erosion of Garner and the deterrent to recourse to the "curative" federal
machinery flowing from the state award of psychic damages as well as lost
pay. The dissent also pointed to the state's duplication of the NLRB's back
pay remedy and contended that the interest in a complete equitable remedy
did not justify the frustration of both "the remedial pattern of the Federal
Act' 134 and the "uniformity of substantive law so essential to matters having
an impact on national labor regulation."' 35 Finally, the dissent forcefully
rejected the significance attached by the majority to the contractual nature of
the state action, stating:
[T]he presence or absence of pre-emption is a consequence of the
effect of state action on the aims of federal legislation, not a game that
is played with labels or an exercise in artful pleading. In a preemption case decided upon what now seems to be discarded principles, the author of today's majority opinion declared: "Controlling
132. The "contract theory" of the union constitution has been criticized as a fiction

which disregards the fact that the constitutional provisions are unduly vague, are not the
product of consensus or negotiation, and are frequently subject to an unlimited amending
power. See, e.g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 H Rv. L. REv.
1049, 1054-58 (1951). It is true that the contract concept does not neatly attach to the
relationship between a union and its members. But it is also true that contract is a
flexible concept which in many fields (e.g., corporations and public utilities, not to speak
of "quasi contracts") is applied to arrangements which are neither negotiated nor
consensual. The technical limitations of the contract concept are less important than its
usefulness in protecting reasonable expectancies or in restraining, through "public policy"
limitations, "abuses" of power. For these purposes, the contract concept, applied in the
light of the distinctive relationships involved, appears to be as useful a tool for defining
and shaping the mutual responsibilities of the union and its members as any other which
is available.
133. 356 U.S. at 618-21.
134. Id. at 632.
135. Id. at 631. The dissent also urged that the provision for private remedies in
LMRA § 303 by implication excluded all other private remedies. This contention ignores
the fact that § 303 was defining new substantive liaibilities in an area where state law
had often excluded any relief. The provision for private actions in such situations is a
dubious basis for ousting state power to grant relief for established categories of liability,
such as contract liability, operating in an area, such as union internal affairs, which is in
general subject to state power.
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and therefore superseding federal power cannot be curtailed by the
State even though the ground of intervention be different than that
on which federal supremacy has been exercised." Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch ....136
There is considerable force to the dissenters' charge that Gonzales is
inconsistent with the Court's previous declarations, which had implied an
ouster of overlapping state remedies regardless of their labels.'8 7 Nevertheless,
several distinctive elements in Gonzales invited a departure from, or a reshaping of, earlier pronouncements. First, supervision of internal union affairs has
a close functional connection with the policing of union security arrangements.
Indeed, the desire of some members to acquire and to retain union membership
results from the fact that membership is often a practical, if illegal, condition
of employment. This connection renders somewhat artificial a federal-state
allocation which grants the states authority to restore membership, but grants
to the federal board alone authority to compensate for the economic losses
resulting from violation of the rights of membership.
Such a concept of divided jurisdiction involves obvious obstacles to
prompt and adequate relief. State relief confined to restoration of membership
is often subject to great delays and uncertainties as a result of the requirement
that a member exhaust internal union remedies. An expelled member may,
moreover, be reluctant to file a charge with the NLRB, because of fear of
prejudicing such internal union remedies and being forced to resort to the
uncertainties of state litigation. Accordingly, the expelled union member who
wishes to remain in a given occupation and to avoid friction with the union
leadership may initially resort to internal union remedies. If these are unavailing, his remedy from the Board is subject to the requirement that a
charge be filed within six months after the alleged job discrimination occurred
or continued.1 38 The delay involved in resort to union remedies and the evidentiary obstacles to showing a continuing violation may create substantial
practical difficulties. But even if the expellee surmounts these difficulties and
secures a Board cease and desist order, that order, without a restoration of
membership, may not as a practical matter effectively protect him against
future discrimination that will not be amenable to proof.8 9 Furthermore, even
136. 356 U.S. at 632-33 (dissenting opinion).

(Footnote omitted.)
137. The dissenters declared that state and federal courts had been unanimous in
denying state power to award damages for employer discriminations (instigated by unions)
against nonmembers. Id. at 628-29. But see Selles v. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
50 Wash. 2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958); ef. Thorman
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 634, 320 P.2d
494, 497 (1958) (dictum).
138. LMRA § 10(b).
139. In industries with a closed shop tradition, employers may be reluctant to hire or
retain a person who is not a union member even though the union does not press for such
job discrimination. Where the union expels a member, such employer reluctance may
make proof of resulting job discrimination extremely difficult. It is true that covert
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if the Board's order is effective, an expelled member may wish to have his
membership restored for reasons independent of its utility as a defense
against discrimination. Thus, if he is to vindicate all of his rights despite the
union's unwillingness to correct its error, the alternative to the Gonzales decision would be two proceedings against the union.1 40 These practical shortcomings of the concept of divided jurisdiction give considerable support to the
result in Gonzales.
Although that result appears to sanction the overlap condemned in Garner,
it should be observed that the states' conceded jurisdiction over the internal
affairs of unions, coupled with the competence sanctioned by subsection 14(b),
excludes the possibility that damages will be imposed on the basis of standards which involve an encroachment on protected activities. Generally, any
job discrimination against an expelled member because of his expulsion will
violate the LMRA and thus will not be protected. But in the event that an
expellee suffers economic loss as a result of his expulsion without a violation
of the LMRA being involved, 141 state competence over both union security
arrangements and internal affairs would prevent the state action from encroaching on protected activities. Accordingly, there is no basis in the
Gonzales situation for the fear expressed in Garner, that state action would
impose accountability for protected activities. And where such a possibility
does not exist, the interest in avoiding state duplication of the federal remedy
is a doubtful basis for limiting the states' general competence over internal
142
affairs.
It is significant that in a comparable situation the possible existence of a
Board remedy has not excluded alternative forms of relief by courts. In Syres
forms of discrimination against employees whom unions have been forced to restore to
membership are also possible, but the employee's possession of a union card would appear
to increase somewhat the obstacles to the effectiveness of such tactics.
140. Multiple litigation scarcely promotes a healthy continuing relationship between
the union and its members.
141. For example, an employee expelled from a union for invoking -the fifth amendment as to questions concerning alleged membership in the Communist Party may thereafter be discharged by his employer. Whether such a discharge violates the LMRA turns
on a hairline distinction, vi., whether it was based on the employee's expulsion from the
union rather than the employer's unwillingness to retain employees suspected of being
Communists. See Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 954, 964-65 (1953).
Whatever.the result under the LMRA, expulsion under such circumstances, if not
authorized by the union constitution, could be remedied by a state direction of restoration
of membership and (pre-emption aside) by a damage award. Cf. Allen v. Office
Employee's Union, 329 P.2d 205 (Wash. 1958).
142. The present no man's land resulting from the Guss case and the NLRB's jurisdictional policies is, of course, another practical aspect of the remedial situation. See
notes 170-87 infra and accompanying text. Guss, coupled with a declination of jurisdiction
by the Board, would deny the wronged member any compensatory relief if state power
were ousted. This anomaly is a pervasive consequence of the no man's land. But in an
area so intimately connected with state competence over internal affairs, there are special
reasons for limiting the no man's land by recognizing state power. Furthermore, recogniton of the implications of § 14(b) and its legislative history would constitute an independent basis for Gonzales; but such an approach would require the overruling of
Plankinton.
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v. Oil Workers,143 the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to grant relief for a breach of the bargaining representative's duty of
fair representation despite the fact that (1) the breach involved might have
been an unfair labor practice, 144 and (2) even in the absence of an unfair labor
practice, the Board could have decertified the representative if it did not abandon its discriminatory representation. 145 It is not easy to see why a partial
Board remedy of doubtful effectiveness should be fatal to state power in the
Gonzales situation when such a remedy does not oust the federal courts of
jurisdiction over discriminatory representation.
Subsection 14(b) is relevant not only to consummated hiring arrangements which violate state laws operative under that subsection, but also to antecedent pressures directed at securing such arrangements. Where such pressures appear to violate the LMRA as well as state law, the Court, without any
explicit consideration of subsection 14(b), has invalidated state injunctive
relief.146 It is true that Garner on the surface appears to exclude such state
action. But the applicability of Garner is questionable because subsection
14(b) and its legislative history suggest, as already indicated, that state
policy as to union shop arrangements was to be given paramount effect. Such

143. 350 U.S. 892, reversing per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
144. Professor Cox has urged that union bargaining which violates the duty of fair
representation should be held to be a violation of § 8(b) (3) of the LMRA. Cox, The
Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vii. L. REv. 151, 172-75 (1957). Although recognizing
the technical difficulties involved, Cox has not considered whether more vigorous enforcement by the Board of the duty of fair representation would interfere with its other
functions. The problem results not merely from the great delays already involved in
Board proceedings, but also from the fact that the most flagrant and the most easily
identifiable departures from fair representation involve racial discrimination. Vigorous
intervention in this area by the Board might provoke budget cutting by Congress; hostility
from the Southern bloc might be intensified by the absence of clear statutory authority.
This political factor is also passed over by Professor Wellington, who, moved by the
Board's expertise, recommends a statute conferring responsibility on the Board for
enforcing the duty of fair representation. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility it; a Federal System, 67 YALE LJ. 1327, 1359 (1958).

But reliance on the "Board's expertise," which is easily and frequently exaggerated, may
merely obscure the enormous difficulties involved in policing the duty of fair representation, except where flagrant racial discrimination is involved. Snce it is likely that more

vigorous enforcement of that duty would be directed largely at such discrimination, a
judicial remedy may be preferable to an administrative one because the former remedy is
dispersed and is less vulnerable to budgetary reprisals. Although the judicial remedy
suffers from the absence of government-supplied counsel, private counsel may be available
-at least in the area of racial discrimination--even though individual litigants may not
be able or willing to pay the fees. Furthermore, since the basic problem in this area
appears to be inadequate preventive relief, the possible bias of juries in actions for damages
may be put aside.
145. See Syres v. Oil Workers, 223 F.2d 739, 747 (5th Cir.) (Rives, J., dissenting)
(by implication), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
146. In Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
299 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1957), picketing to secure the employment of union members
exclusively was enjoined as a violation of the Tennessee "right-to-worl'
law. The
Supreme Court reversed per curiam, 353 U.S. 969 (1957), citing Weber and Garner.
The underlying facts together with these citations suggest that the basis for the Court's
decision was the overlap between the state injunction and the NLRB's remedy for violation of LMRA § 8 (b) (2).
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paramount authority should apply not only to consummated hiring arrangements, but also to antecedent pressures directed toward their achievement.
Where antecedent pressures violate state law without violating the
LMRA, there are even stronger grounds for recognizing state competence to
grant injunctive relief. The denial of such competence would result in a selfdefeating jurisprudence which would command an employer not to enter into
a union security agreement while denying him any relief against pressures
147
designed to compel the execution of such an agreement.
It is true that the recognition of state competence would involve the risk
of restraint by state tribunals of activities which might be found to be protected under the national scheme, a risk which might be especially acute in
states where enactment of "right-to-work" laws may reflect antiunion attitudes. Restraints on protected activity might occur, for example, where the
state tribunal determined, on the basis of conflicting or ambiguous evidence,
that union pressure was directed at securing hiring arrangements proscribed
by state law, but where the NLRB might reasonably reach a contrary conclu-.
sion. Subsection 14(b) tolerates such risks with regard to state adjudications
concerning the validity of the executed arrangements. If appropriate weight
is given to the policy and legislative history of subsection 14(b), it is not
easy to see why such risks should be fatal when antecedent union pressures are
involved.
VIII. STATE LAWS OF GENERAL APPLIcATION

Some commentators, although in general urging a limited role for state
power over labor relations, have suggested that for pre-emption purposes a
distinction should be drawn between labor regulations "as such" and "state
regulation of general application." The thrust of this position, which may be
illustrated by the views of Professor Cox,1 48 appears to be that the states

should be free to enforce general regulations even though such enforcement
involves conduct which is or might plausibly be prohibited or protected under
the national scheme. The proposed formula would, of course, avoid the regulatory gaps and the drastic impairment of state power which would result if all
state law of general application were foreclosed whenever it impinged on labormanagement relations.
The formula, however, involves several difficulties. First, it rests on a
classification scheme which, as Professor Cox recognized, 49 would be extremely difficult to apply to the wide variety of state regulations involved.
147. For illustrations of this problem see Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 181 Kan. 775, 798, 317 P2d 349, 366 (1957) (concurring opinion);
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Local 379, Int!l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 247 N.C. 620, 627-28,
101 S.E.2d 800, 806 (1958).
148. See Cox, Federalism it the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAav. L. REv. 1297,
1324-31 (1954).
149. Ibid.
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Secondly, it appears to dilute the values of uniformity and the avoidance of fine
lines of distinction which have been urged in support of comprehensive preemption. These difficulties will be examined and then the predictive value of
this formula will be appraised in the light of the Supreme Court decisions.
The common law of labor relations began as a branch of the law of torts
and emerged in the twentieth century as a distinct body of regulation. 15 0 The
common law basis for state prohibition of stranger picketing for recognition
typically is the general tort doctrine that intentional interferences with advantageous relationships are tortious unless justified and that a union's desire to
spread organization is not sufficient justification.151 It can be urged that such a
state regulation is merely a general application of tort law to labor-management
relations. But, Professor Cox urges, the application of the tort doctrine involves a social appraisal of the conflicting interests of the union, the employer,
and the community in the labor controversy. Since the existence of a labor
dispute is central to the social appraisal involved, the application of tort doctrines to make the union's conduct actionable is labor regulation "as such."'1 2
The critical element in Professor Cox's classification thus appears to be that
liability depends on an appraisal of the distinctive elements of labor-management relations in the light of other competing interests or objectives.
The basic difficuly with such a formula is that substantially the same
social appraisal is involved in any rational legislative or judicial determination
that any general regulation should be controlling in the labor-management
context. For example, a union which has entered into price fixing agreements
with employers or into agreements excluding the purchase of out-of-state
goods is indicted under a broad state antitrust law condemning all arrangements and conspiracies in restraint of trade. The disputed issue is whether
the distinctive aspects of the union movement justify a refusal to apply a
general standard in the context of labor-management relations. Although the
technique for resolving such an issue will depend on whether a statute or a
common law standard is controlling, its resolution will turn on what force
should be given to the union's claim that there is a social justification for
exempting it from a general standard which on the surface appears to be
applicable. It is precisely such a claim which must be adjudicated when a
union urges its "right" to engage in stranger picketing or to induce the breach
of a contract between an employer and another union. In view of the basic
similarity of the social appraisal involved in the antitrust and prima facie
150. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 6.13, at 523-26 (1956).
151. See, e.g., Keith Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 403-04, 187 Atl. 692, 697
(1936). The rationale for subsequent decisions reaching a similar result has naturally been
affected by the pin-pointing of the issues involved, by frequent litigation as well as
by state and federal statutes. See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. 2d 1338 (1950).
152. Cox, Federalinm in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297, 1324
(1954).
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tort situations, the distinction between labor regulation as such and regulations
of general application appears to be essentially verbal; for whenever the state
has concluded that a given rule should control labor relations despite the distinctive elements involved, there is no analytical basis for determining whether
the state regulation deals with labor relations as such or is a rule of general
application applied to labor-management relations.
The difficulty of classification is illustrated by Professor Cox's criticism
of the decision by the Missouri Supreme Court in the Weber case. 1 53 His
criticism rested on the contention that the court, in holding the restraint in
question unlawful under the Missouri antitrust law, relied on the following
ground:
.. .under the terms .. .sought to be imposed by the Union, persons employed by or seeking to work for the . . . construction
contractors in moving, erecting or installing machinery . . .would
be compelled to forego representation by their present bargaining
agent, the Millwrights' Union .. .and become affiliated with the
Machinists' Union in order to retain their employment with such
contractors ....154
Accordingly, Professor Cox concluded that the underlying issue was made to
turn "on balancing the interests of employers, employees, and unions in
organization or collective bargaining, [and that under such circumstances]
the states should be no more free to apply antitrust laws than statutes or
' 55
court decisions avowedly based upon those considerations."'
Under Professor Cox's view, the rhetoric used by the Missouri Supreme
Court seems to be the decisive consideration in denying state competence.
Plainly, state courts and legislatures, determined to uphold state power, will
be able to accommodate themselves to the semantic demands of the situation.
Indeed, other passages in the Missouri opinion, not referred to by Professor
Cox, if taken at face value, support the conclusion that Missouri was implementing a general policy against restraint of trade and not labor regulation
"as such." Thus the court emphasized throughout that the union was seeking
to force the company to become a party to a conspiracy against independent
contractors and their millwright employees, 156 i.e., the union was seeking an
agreement which would exclude from the market all contractors not under
contract with the union. Such agreements, which may be viewed as attempts
at permanent exclusion from a market, can plausibly be said to involve the
basic evils which antitrust regulation is designed to suppress. It is worth
153. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber, 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W.2d 325 (1954), rev'd,
348 U.S. 468 (1955).
154. Id. at 579, 265 S.W.2d at 328.
155. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAgv. L. REv. 1297, 1330
(1954).
156. 364 Mo. at 579-82, 265 S.W.2d at 328-30.
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recalling that the basic dispute involved in Weber had moved a national
administration, not unfriendly to labor, to institute antitrust proceedings
against a union seeking the same kind of exclusive arrangements condemned
157
by Missouri in the Weber case.
These considerations underscore the difficulties with the contention that
Missouri's regulation should have been invalidated because the Missouri judgment resulted from balancing the interests involved in labor regulation. This
contention is no more persuasive than the claim that Missouri attempted to
balance the interests involved in the application of general regulation in a
specialized context, namely, labor-management disputes. Nor is there anything
in the application of Professor Cox's formula to the Weber case which affords
a useful guide for determining when general regulation, such as antitrust
regulation, will for pre-emption purposes be treated as general regulation
rather than as labor regulation "as such."
Although, as indicated more fully below, the formula in question may be
a useful expedient for avoiding the drastic displacement of a broad range of
state regulation, it involves a serious risk of making pre-emption a game played
with labels which do not disclose the determinants of decision. In this connection, it is instructive to compare Professor Cox's treatment of Weber with
his treatment of a general regulation applied by a state to invalidate the erection
of geographical trade barriers by a union through agreements with employers
to boycott goods not produced in a given locality. Professor Cox, despite his
approval of the foreclosure of state power in Weber, supports the recognition of state competence in the latter situation.'r s It is not easy to see
the basis for this difference in result. In both situations the unions are
attempting to maximize employment opportunities for their members by
permanently excluding certain enterprises from the market. 15 9 In both situations similar arrangements among employers would appear to violate state
antitrust laws. Accordingly, the ultimate issue faced by state governments
157. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
158. Cox, Federalismin the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. Rzv. 1297, 1330-31
(1954). The example is suggested by Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), and Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 274 App.
Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S2d 874 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 877, 83 N.Y.S.2d
228 (1st Dep't 1948). In view of the possible overlap between state and federal antitrust laws in the situations described in the text, it should be noted that national antitrust legislation has generally not been viewed as pre-empting state regulation. E.g.,

Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 421-22 (1910) ; Commonwealth v. McHugh,

326 Mass. 249, 264-68, 93 N.E.2d 751, 761-64 (1950). As to state antitrust law applied
to labor-management relations, this view merits re-examination because of the interlacing
of federal labor statutes and the Sherman Act in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941), and the pre-emption of state power over labor relations.
159. It is true that in the Weber situation the particular exclusionary arrangements
would be terminated after the appropriate shift in the union status of the excluded enterprises' employees. But such a shift might touch off new exclusionary pressures on the
part of the rival union. Furthermore, in the case of exclusion based on location, exclusion
presumably could also be ended by plant relocation which would bring the enterprise
within the orbit of the union enforcing the exclusionary arrangements.
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in each case is whether a union's interest in maximizing employment for its
members justifies a relaxation of the general rules against restraint of trade.
It is difficult to see anything in the distinction between labor regulation "as
such" and general regulation which warrants different decisions as to state
power in these two situations. Nor do the interests emphasized in Garner,
such as centralized administration of the national act and avoidance of overlap,
warrant such disparate results. Thus, if the unions struck for each of the
objects involved in these cases, there would in each case be similar possibilities
of an overlap between state and federal remedies. 16 0 Consequently, all of the
arguments against state power invoked in Garner would be equally applicable
to both situations.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Professor Cox's formula will
spawn a new set of slippery distinctions, thereby frustrating one of the purposes
behind his general endorsement of a broad doctrine of federal pre-emption.
Furthermore, that formula also threatens the other values invoked to support
such a doctrine, namely, uniformity and preservation of the federally created
balance between labor and management. These consequences of the formula
are interesting not only in their own right but also-and more importantlybecause the necessity of invoking such a formula to avoid drastic impairment
of state power puts into question the basic presupposition behind a broad
and abstract rule of federal pre-emption.
The Court's decisions which bear on the proposed distinction between
labor and general regulation have not accorded significant weight to the fact
that state regulation was of general application. At most, the Court has
treated that factor as reinforcing other considerations invoked to sustain
state power.1 6 ' As already indicated, that distinction will not serve to explain
162
the Court's disposition of Weber, nor its recent decision, the Oliver case,
160. A strike in both the Weber and the geographical boycott situation might involve
a violation of LMRA § 8(b) (4) (A). See generally Koretz, Federal Regulation of
Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-Another Chapter, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 125 (1959).
161. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958);

United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
162. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
In Oliver, the Teamsters Union and certain truckers, after bargaining on a multi-employer

and multi-state basis, entered into an agreement fixing minimum rental rates and other

terms of leases under which "owner-operators" were to operate their own vehicles for
the truckers. The Ohio courts held that this agreement was not an unfair labor practice,
that it violated the state's antitrust law, and that it was, accordingly, enjoinable. Oliver
v. All-States Freight, Inc., 42 L.R.R.M. 2024 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), aff'd mem. sub nora.
Oliver v. A. C. E. Transp. Co., 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 NE.2d 856 (1958). The Supreme
Court, dismissing as immaterial Ohio's characterization of its regulation as "antitrust,"
reversed. 358 U.S. at 297. The Court found (1) that the challenged provision was
designed to protect the employees' wage rates from being indirectly undermined by rental

rates below the "owner-operators'" operating costs, and (2) that bargaining concerning
the rental rates was mandatory under the LMRA. Accordingly, it invalidated the Ohio
decree as an interference with federally protected collective bargaining.
Oliver raises the following questions, among others: (1) Could the Court properly
find that bargaining over the owner-operators' rates was mandatory without a prior
determination that the owners were not independent contractors, which characterization
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which was decided after the writing of this article and which can only be
briefly referred to below. Indeed, in Gonzales the dissenters pointed to broad
language in Weber which rejected as irrelevant the contention that the state
was applying a rule of general application. 1 3 Conversely, the fact that
Wisconsin, in the Kohler case, predicated its restraint of violence on a labor
1 4
relations statute did not operate to invalidate state action.
Perhaps the most striking instance of the Court's disregard of the distinction in question and its invalidation of general regulation is its treatment
of state cases involving enforcement of so-called "hot cargo" clauses entered
into by common carriers and unions representing their employees. Such clauses
frequently purport to give the carrier's employees the right not to cross
picket lines and to refuse to handle "hot cargo," defined to include nonunion
materials or materials produced by, or consigned to, another employer with
whom the contracting union or some other union has a controversy. Hot
cargo clauses appear plainly to be inconsistent with the historic duty of common
carriers to serve without discrimination, a duty which arises under state as
well as federal transportation law. Interference with that duty by private
nonunion groups could be remedied by state injunctions. Where such injunctions or similar relief have been directed at unions or employers who are
would have excluded them from coverage of the act? (Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Division
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), and the Garner case.) Mr. Justice Whittaker
apparently assumed not and dissented solely on the basis of his conclusion that the owneroperators were independent contractors. 358 U.S. at 297. (But as to that conclusion,
compare § 4 of the challenged provisions. Id. at 298.) His dissent leads to question (2) :
Given Garner's emphasis on "primary interpretation," may state courts, or indeed the
Supreme Court, characterize, prior to an NLRB determination, ostensible independentcontractors as genuine ones? Since this characterization often marks the line between
illegal price fixing or protected collective bargaining, question (2) is crucial to the validity
of a wide range of state antitrust activity. (3) Even though state tribunals properly
conclude that no substantial independent-contractor question is involved, are they to be
prevented from applying local antitrust laws to collective bargaining agreements on the
ground that there is a reasonable or plausible possibility that a particular agreement may
be appropriate to protect employees' rates or jobs and hence may be protected under the
national statute? (4) Will the exclusion of state authority extend to agreements even
though they deal with matters not the subject of mandatory bargaining, on the ground
that § 8(d) of the LMRA also "protects" such agreements? (5) Will agreements resulting from bargaining protected by the LMRA be insulated against federal as well as
state antitrust laws? Or, conversely, will the violation of federal antitrust laws result
in the withdrawal of LMRA protection? In this connection, the Court in Oliver pointed
to the absence of any contention that the agreements went beyond the limits of federal
antitrust immunity set by Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
325 U.S. 797 (1945). Generally, conduct which contravenes another federal statute is
unprotected under the LMRA. But this generality does not identify the agency which
is to accommodate two competing statutory policies. (Compare the jurisdictional renvoi
between the Board and the ICC concerning hot cargo clauses, described in note 165
infra.) Startling as the result may seem, it is conceivable that federal antitrust prosecutions of labor-management arrangements may depend on, or be limited by, determinations
under the LMRA concerning the independent-contractor issue or the scope of federally
protected bargaining. Cf. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 497-98
(1958); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). But cf. United States v.
Radio Corp. of America, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4179 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1959) ; Local 1976, United
Bhd. of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 109-11 (1958).'
163. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
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parties to hot cargo clauses, the Court has, however, reversed, per curiam. 165
Furthermore, the Court has chosen not to notice that such cases involve three
separable, though related, issues: (1) Whether a union may enlist the help
of the employees of employer B, a common carrier, in order to secure the
union's demands against employer A, the "primary employer." This issue
involves the scope of the secondary boycott provision of LMRA subsection
8(b) (4) (A). (2) Whether a hot cargo clause is valid under the general
transportation law of the state-an issue which has been pin-pointed in state
66
litigation by requests for a declaration of the invalidity of such clauses.
(3) Whether a state injunction may require not only the carriers but also
their employees not to interfere with the rendition of equal services to the
primary employer.
A persuasive argument could be made that state determination of the
second issue involves the effect of a transportation regulation of general
application and not labor regulation "as such." A similar argument could be
made as to an injunction running against the carriers' employees and prohibiting interference with the carriers' discharge of their obligations, although the
argument in this context involves greater difficulties.' 67 Indeed, the Court,
165. E.g., Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957),
reversing per curiam Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v. Cook Truck Lines, Inc., 296 S.W.2d
379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956). A comparison of the Court's apparent refusal to separate
these issues in pre-emption cases with the ICC's approach is instructive. The ICC has
declared that the validity of agreements between unions and carriers is a matter solely
within the NLRB's competence. (At about the same time, two of the three members
of the Board who declared hot cargo clauses executed by common carriers invalid justified
this result by reference to the Interstate Commerce Act and the ICC rulings thereunder.
Genuine Parts Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1957)). The ICC, although deferring to the
Board's expertise in labor matters, has asserted its own jurisdiction over the conduct of
common carriers in relation to their public obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act,
without regard to terms included in their collective bargaining agreements. The Commission has decided that a carrier's refusal to provide service because of its hot cargo
clause violates the Interstate Commerce Act. Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor
Lines, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 617 (1957). Since the concurrent jurisdiction of the states over
common carriers has been recognized, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co.,
237 U.S. 121 (1915), it is difficult to see why the states, any more than the ICC, should
be disabled from enforcing their general policy against a carrier merely because of the
carrier's involvement in a labor dispute.
166. See Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v. Cook Truck Lines, Inc., supra note 165,
at 382.
167. Only a brief reference to the complex argument involved is possible here. Where
the employees of a secondary employer (here, the carrier) refuse to cross a picket line
adjacent to a primary employer (here, the shipper or consignee) or refuse to handle or
process the primary employer's goods, the employees' refusal is, unless sanctioned by a
contract, unprotected, i.e., the carrier could lawfully discharge them. Robert H. Snow,
107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953) ; ef. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
In the common carrier context, the validity of such a contract is uncertain. See Local 1976,
United Bhd. of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108 (1958). Furthermore,
the coalescence of labor and transportation policy complicates the issue of what federal
tribunal has jurisdiction to pass on the issue of validity. See note 165 supra. Insofar as
the states are concerned, their jurisdiction to enforce the carrier's duty to serve without
discrimination was confirmed, prior to the enactment of the LMRA. Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1915). Insofar as relations between the carrier
and its customers are concerned, state competence would appear to extend to the validity
or effect of a hot cargo clause. Even if Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
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in dealing with the significance of a hot cargo clause as a defense to a charge
of violation of the LMRA's ban against secondary boycotts, explicitly recognized that the impact of a hot cargo clause on the carrier's obligation to serve
was a matter of transportation, rather than labor, policy.' 8 In dealing with
state power over hot cargo clauses the Court did not, however, consider the
separation of the transportation issue from the related issues, but instead, by
cryptic per curiam decisions, nullified the state action in toto.
If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the label or the generality of
state regulation is not a passport to validity, either all general regulation
impinging on labor-management relations will be invalidated unless the challenged regulation falls within established exceptions to the general rule of
pre-emption, or supplementary criteria will have to be developed. Total
invalidity would involve so drastic an attrition of state power and would leave
such regulatory gaps as to be almost unthinkable. It would, for example, be
bizarre indeed to strike down FEPC regulation, antitrust regulation, transportation regulation, and various forms of safety regulation merely because
such regulation limited the objectives sought in collective bargaining. On
the other hand, the development of supplementary criteria which will give
meaningful guidance to those affected and to state tribunals will be no easy
task. Perhaps, all that can be said is that the decisive factor will be a judgment
(1957), has displaced state law, state competence to apply federal law to collective
bargaining agreements may be upheld. See part II of this article, which will appear in
the February issue of this Review.
State attempts to regulate employee activity on the ground that it defeats the state
transportation policy would, however, involve the possibility of overlap with federal remedies or encroachment on federally protected activities. Nevertheless, in this context,
whether the employee conduct is protected depends on the validity of the hot cargo clauseand that issue could be characterized as dominantly one of transportation policy although
labor policy is also "incidentally" involved. The crucial bearing of transportation policy
on the issue might justify reliance on Briggs-Stratton as authority for state determination
of whether the employees' refusal to serve was federally protected. A negative determination would be the basis for state competence to enjoin employee interference with
the carrier's discharge of its duty to serve, i.e., an injunction requiring the employees to
cross the picket line. Whether state power should be exercised in a given situation and
the possible impact of anti-injunction legislation are, of course, separate questions.
A final complication results from the puzzling proviso of § 8(b) (4) of the LMRA
which states that "nothing contained in this subsection [ (b)] shall be construed to make
unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than
his own employer) if the employees . . . are engaged in a strike ratified . . . by a

representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize ......
(Emphasis added.) This complex provision cannot be fully treated here. It is worth
noting, however, that the italicized language implies that there may be sources of restraint
against respect for picket lines other than those embodied in § 8(b) (4). Furthermore,
although the prohibition against involuntary servitude might bar judicial compulsion to
force employees to cross picket lines, that prohibition would not preclude judicial restraint
of actions by unions to bring about a boycott by the employees of common carriers. The
problems involved in commanding employees of common carriers to serve without discrimination resemble, it may be noted, those involved in compelling employees to serve
others without regard to their race or creed.
This footnote is not offered as a solution of the problems involved, but only as a
suggestion that they do not seem appropriate for per curiam disposition.
168. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 110-11

(1958).

HeinOnline -- 59 Colum. L. Rev. 54 1959

1959]

JURISDICTION OVER LABOR RELATIONS

as to the impact of the state regulation on the central purposes of the national
act. For example, FEPC regulation, barring the use of either collective
bargaining or employer-determined hiring practices as an instrument of
racial discrimination, might well be treated differently from state-imposed
wage ceilings or from general licensing requirements applicable to all agents
of out-of-state organizations who solicit dues or the power to represent persons
in their economic relations. 16 9 Different treatment of those situations would
appear to be justified because the effect of FEPC legislation seems to be
more remote from the central objectives of the union movement and seems
to involve less of a threat to collective bargaining and employee freedom to
choose representatives than do the other forms of state regulation referred
to above. It is plain, however, that difficult issues of degree are involved and
that there is a genuine danger that resolution of these issues will require the
Court to engage in the slippery game of passing on the wisdom of the state
action or the propriety or conventionality of the union objectives. But similar
risks are a familiar and a possibly inescapable aspect of federalist accommodation.
In this process of accommodation, the fact that the state regulation applies
generally to nonunion as well as union activity, although not decisive, is not
wholly irrelevant. The generality of the regulation may, together with other
considerations, reflect the importance which a state attaches to the values involved. The requirement of generality may, moreover, curb regulations devised
for the sole purpose of creating roadblocks to effective union organization or
collective bargaining. But the reality of such a curb would, of course, depend
on whether drafting skills or selective enforcement policies could be exploited
to dress up antiunion legislation as general regulation. These considerations,
which suggest that in some situations weight may be attached to the fact that
regulation is of general application, are not offered as neat logical solutions
for difficult questions of degree. They are essentially pragmatic limitations
both on the range of state power which will be validated and on the otherwise
broad sweep of current pre-emption doctrines.

IX. NLRB

SELF-LIMITATION AND STATE COMPETENCE

Guss v. Utah Labor Relations BdY °0 involved the most dramatic attrition
of state power in the area of labor relations. In Guss, the Court, with Justices
Burton and Clark dissenting, ruled that the NLRB's ad hoc decision not to
handle a specific case or its general standards limiting its statutory jurisdiction did not result in state authority to handle matters thus excluded from
the Board's effective jurisdiction. The proviso added to Subsection 10(a) of
169. For a case dealing with the latter situation see Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson,
325 U.S. 538 (1945).
170. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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the Wagner Act by Taft-Hartley provided, the Court concluded, the only
method by which the states could be authorized to handle matters within the
Board's statutory jurisdiction. That proviso empowered the Board to cede
jurisdiction over certain cases to a state agency provided that there was
conformity between the state regulation and the national statute. The Court
read the proviso as excluding state action in cases where the Board, instead
171
of ceding its jurisdiction, declined to exercise it.
No state has been able to meet the requirements of the proviso, as interpreted by the NLRB. Accordingly, the result of Guss and the Board's policy
of selective jurisdiction is a notorious no man's land in which conduct unlawful under both federal and state law is not restrained by the Board and cannot
constitutionally be restrained by the states. This result, which under any
circumstances would be indefensible as a matter of policy, is a grotesque
paradox in the context of the LMRA. That statute in general expanded
regulation of labor relations. It reflected, moreover, both in its provisions' 7"
and in its legislative history' 73 a special concern for the labor relations of
smaller enterprises. And yet all regulation of the labor relations of such
enterprises is suspended unless they fall within the ill-defined and shrinking
category of businesses which do not "affect commerce" or unless exceptions
to pre-emption, e.g., cases involving violence, are applicable. This result is
an eloquent reminder of the difficulties produced by the failure of Congress
to bring responsible craftsmanship to bear on the problems of federalism
7 4

implicit in the LMRA.1

Guss has sharpened for both the national government and state tribunals
a set of problems the solution of which will determine the extent of effective
labor regulation in the present no man's land and the scope of state authority
over "small business." These essentially national problems include: (1) The
validity of the Board's jurisdictional standards, which for some time have been
challenged as beyond the Board's statutory authority 175 and which, after Guss,
171. The alternatives to the Guss result have been the subject of exhaustive discussions, which will not be recapitulated or appraised here. See Tobriner & Grodin, TaftHartley Pre-emption in the Area of NLRB Inaction, 44 CALIF. L. REV.663 (1956).
172. See, e.g., LMRA § 8(b) (4) (A), which proscribes union pressure to force an
employer or self-employed person to join a union. This problem typically arises in
connection with small businesses.
173. For example, the late Senator Taft declared during the legislative debate that
"the larger employers can well look after themselves, but throughout the United States
there are hundreds of thousands of smaller employers, smaller businessmen, who, under
the existing statutes, have come gradually to be at the mercy of labor union leaders ....
2 LPGIs. HisT. 1005.
174. In Guss, the Court appeared to invite legislation changing its decision. 353 U.S.
at 11. Legislative efforts have failed in part because they have become enmeshed with
larger differences concerning the content of a desirable national labor policy.
175. See Note, The Discretionary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 71 HARV. L. Rav. 527.
532-34 (1958). The Court was careful to point out in Guss that it was not passing on
the validity of the Board's declining jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis or on the basis of its
general yardsticks. The general standards based on dollar minima might be invalidated
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have been challenged as a violation of the fifth amendment. 176 (2) Revision
by the Board of its jurisdictional standards, with a view to reducing or eliminating the no man's land.177 (3) The content of remedial legislation in the
area "affecting commerce": (a) Should Congress require the Board to
exercise jurisdiction over every enterprise subject, as a matter of constitutional
law, to the commerce power? (b) Should the Board be authorized to limit
its own jurisdiction either by general standards announced in advance or by
ad hoc determinations? (c) Should Congress determine the limits of the
Board's jurisdiction regardless of how those limits are defined? (d) Should
the states be able to act independently of the national policy in the area of
declined jurisdiction? (e) Should state action be subjected to the national
policy through review by the NLRB or by the federal courts, with frivolous
review deterred by the assessment of counsel fees against the culpable party?
Although an extensive discussion of these problems is beyond the scope of
this article, 178 a few general comments may be in order. First, it is plain that
the Court cannot work out viable solutions. The Court can command the
Board to occupy the no man's land, but only Congress can supply the necessary
funds. Although the current Congress has increased appropriations for the
Board,179 Congress, faced with a growing deficit and international tensions,
without necessarily outlawing the ad hoc declinations of jurisdiction. The Board's prac-

tice of ad hoc declination was established under the Wagner Act and was not disturbed
by Taft-Hartley. Although an ad hoc policy would theoretically permit the board to
consider the seriousness of the abuse involved in a particular case, the Board's case load
might make this possibility largely academic. Such a policy would, however, avoid public
announcement of the fact that a federal statute could be violated with impunity. Former
Board Chairman Madden has argued that prior announcement of jurisdictional standards
lets the cat out of the bag. Madden, Comment and Appraisal, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 427, 432
(1955). But the ad hoc policy would revive the uncertainties and the dubious use of staff
which the jurisdictional standards were desigied to eliminate.
176. See, e.g., Johnson v. Grand Rapids Bldg. Trades Council, 42 L.R.R.M. 2680
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 2, 1958), where the exercise of state power was rationalized as
necessary to avoid a violation of due process. But this approach is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's disposition of Guss. See also Ex parte Twedell, 309 S.W.2d 834
(Tex. 1958) ; Heiser Ready Mix Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Case I, No. 6552,
Cw-244, Decision No. 4780, at 21, Wis. Employment Relations Bd., June 2, 1958. Federal
courts, on due process grounds or on the basis of statutory interpretation, may direct the
General Counsel and the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction fully or at least to replace jurisdictional standards with an ad hoc approach. See Heiser Ready Mix Co. v. Fenton,
42 L.R.R.M. 2735 (W.D. Wis. July 9, 1958), where the Board's General Counsel was
directed'to investigate charges of unfair labor practices even though the Board's jurisdictional yardsticks were not satisfied. See also Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99
(1958); Office Employes v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957), 57 COLum. *L. REv. 1029;
Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956); Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187
(D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953).
177. The Board, explaining its action as a result of the Guss decision, announced
proposed changes in its jurisdictional standards. NLRB Statement R-570, July 22, 1958,
1 LAB. REL. REP. (42 L.R.R.M.) 363 (1958). According to Chairman Leedom's testimony
before a House subcommittee on June 10, 1958, the new standards would include 20%
of the cases now rejected. 1 LAB. REL. REP. (42 L.R.R.M.) 185 (1958). The proposed
changes, with further changes expanding the Board's effective jurisdiction, were put into
effect on October 2,1958. 1 LAB. REI. REP. (42 L.R.R.M.) 633 (1958).
178. For a comprehensive discussion of some of these problems see Note, The Discretionary Jurisdictionof the NLRB, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 527 (1958).
179. See 1 LAn. REL. REP. (42 L.R.R.M.) 368 (1958).

HeinOnline -- 59 Colum. L. Rev. 57 1959

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

is an unpredictable provider. The net result of judicial invalidation of the
Board's current policies might mean theoretical relief for employees and
employers involved in small enterprises which "affect commerce" but a denial
of effective relief to all employees and employers by increased delays in an
area where a meaningful remedy must be a prompt one. Such invalidation
is superficially appealing because it would extend protection to those groups
which need it most. But there is a danger, and perhaps a controlling one,
that equality of remedy might in practice be the equalization of chaos.
The problems which would be raised by requiring the Board to exercise
jurisdiction over all of the enterprises affecting commerce obviously cannot
be solved solely by larger appropriations. More money and more staff will
not eliminate, and may indeed accentuate, the difficulties and delays inherent
in an effort by a five-man board in Washington to regulate up to the periphery
of national competence. 180 Changes in the Board's administrative structure,' 8 '
coupled with a review and revision of rigid, time-consuming, and unproductive
statutory and administrative requirements,'1 82 may perhaps make it possible
for the Board to deal with a substantially increased load.
Beyond these questions of efficiency there are naturally touchy and imponderable questions of faith suggested by slogans such as "states' rights"
and "uniformity in a national economy." In this connection it is again useful
to keep in mind the difference between the exercise of federal power to enforce
minimal standards throughout the sphere of national competence and the
exercise of that power to exclude all state regulation. If the federal power
is in its sphere to be exclusive as well as paramount, the vitality of the federalist
ideal together with practical pressures may be strong enough to exclude
federal power entirely from smaller business, thereby jeopardizing minimal
federal objectives in that area. Thus, the accommodation in the no man's
land may well depend on the distribution of federal and state power throughout the whole area of labor relations.
The problems of federal-state accommodation in the no man's land and
elsewhere plainly call for congressional solution. They involve clashes in basic
outlooks and values, the resolution of which generates enormous strains on the
Court-strains on its internal unity and on public acceptance of the finality and
180. See 1 LAB. RFE. REP. (42 L.R.R.M.) 492, 498 (1958).
181. A Board of increased size could be divided into two sections: one entrusted with
representation cases and the other with unfair labor practice cases. The interrelationships
between the two types of cases, especially between unit-determinations and duty to bargain
cases, is an argument against such a division, but the difficulties involved are not
insurmountable.
182. See, e.g., the requirement of a hearing prior to an election, embodied in § 9 (c).
If a representation case does not involve an issue as to effect on commerce, the appropriate
unit, or bars to conducting the election, the insistence on a hearing is often a wholly
dilatory tactic. Unnecessary delays might be avoided without undue curtailment of private
rights by reverting to the Wagner Act practice of affording only the right to a postelection hearing in such cases.
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authority of its judgments. The tensions resulting from the lawless opposition
to integration in education underscore the need for Congress to reduce the
number of sensitive and broad judgments which the Court must make concerning matters which are not controlled by the Constitution but which are subject
to congressional action. Perhaps these considerations, together with the
anomaly of the no man's land, will move Congress to face the intellectual,
political, and practical difficulties raised by legislation which would occupy the
no man's land and which would also provide clearer guides for an adjustment
of federal and state power in the entire area of labor relations.
Pending such action, Guss will complicate jurisdictional determinations
by state agencies. State power theoretically extends only to an ill-defined
category of enterprises which do not "affect commerce." The Court has indicated that contacts with interstate commerce which are more substantial than
183
de minirnis are a sufficient predicate for the exercise of the national power.
The Court has, moreover, made it clear that the existence of national power
is not to be determined solely by the quantitative effect of the activities under
litigation. "Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation
is representative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence
of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce." 184 But there are practical limits to the all-encompassing national
power implicit in this approach. "Scholastic reasoning may prove that no
activity is isolated within the boundaries of a single State, but that cannot
justify absorption of legislative power by the United States over every activity."'1 5 Precisely where scholastic reasoning ends and a functional approach
begins has necessarily been left open. More concretely, the labor cases in which
the Court has delineated the broad reach of the commerce power have not
involved the "small" (or the "very small") retailers 8 6 and service establish183. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1951).
184. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.).
185. Id. at 650. Compare, however, the argument recently made by the Board's
General Counsel:
Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal power over commerce-which is co-extensive with the coverage of the National Act-reaches
the wheat grown by a single farmer for his ozn consumption (Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111), and a retail druggist who removes 12 tablets -from
their out-of-state container and places them in his own box for local sale.
U.S. v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 690, 697-98.
Brief for NLRB, p. 11, NLRB v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 99 F. Supp. 526
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), quoted in Feldblum, Jurisdictional "Tidelands" in Labor Relations,

3 LAB. L.J. 114, 117 (1952).
186. See Guss and its two companion cases, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v.
Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
353 U.S. 26 (1957), for illustrations of enterprises, including retailers, which were not
"large" but were large enough to "affect commerce." See also Howell Chevrolet Co. v.
NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953), sustaining the applicability of the LMRA to a Chevrolet
dealer franchised by General Motors, purchasing $1,000,000 annually from GM, 43% of

which was manufactured out of state. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion.
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ments which are loosely considered to be "local." Whether the Court will
now validate state regulation of such enterprises is wholly conjectural. But
the persistence of the no man's land will invite a vigorous and perhaps, in
constitutional terms, an over-vigorous exercise of state power' 8 7 as the only
method of shrinking the regulatory vacuum. It may also invite the Court, by
denial oi certiorari, to disregard theoretical state encroachments in this area.
Part II of this article, which will appear in the February issue, will discuss the allocation of jurisdiction over the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.
187. For a survey of recent jurisdictional determinations by state agencies see Hays,
Slate Courts and Federal Preemption, 23 Mo. L. REv. 373, 388-94 (1958).
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